"BALKAN WARS (1912-3). - This article gives an account of the wars of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro as allies against Turkey in 1912 and 1913, and the short war which followed between the former allies, with Turkey and Rumania intervening, in the summer of 1913.
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The formation of a military alliance between Bulgaria and Serbia, Greece and Montenegro in 1912 was the final step in an evolution which began in 1909, and in its last stages was hastened by the Italo-Turkish War of 1911. The immediate cause of war was the state of Macedonia under Turkish rule. On June 19 1912 a military agreement was made between the general staffs of Serbia and Bulgaria, in accordance with the previous political treaty of alliance signed on Feb. 29 1912. Greece followed suit with a political treaty in May and a military agreement on Sept. 22. Montenegro did the same in the course of the summer, and, while Turkey was still negotiating her peace with Italy at Ouchy, the four allies mobilized their armies (Sept. 30 and Oct. 1 N.S.). Turkey, since the Young Turk Revolution internally dislocated, was in no condition to meet their onslaught. Although the prestige of the individual Turkish soldier as a fighting man stood high, and the beginnings of many reforms in the education of staff and regimental officers had been made in the last few years, the military capacity of the army as a whole proved to be far below the reputation which it enjoyed amongst the military experts of Europe. Turkey's opponents, on the contrary, had in recent years not only rearmed themselves and secured their financial and political position, but also made those minute and careful preparations of detail which when the time comes translate themselves into smooth concentration, and regular, consistent operations.
Strategically no less than politically, Turkey was on the defensive. Her European possessions formed two separate theatres of war, Macedonia and Thrace, which were linked only by the coastal railway Dede Aghach - Seres - Salonika, and this line, open in its middle section to Bulgarian raids from the mountains on the N. and to Greek raids from the sea,' was of no high technical efficiency in any 1 The possession of one modern ship, the" Averof, "gave to the Greeks material superiority over the Turks at sea, and the maritime traditions and aptitudes of their race a certain moral advantage.
case. The dispersion of a large part of her army and notably of her reserves in Asia Minor, where rail communications were few, and roads ill-developed, made any reinforcement of the European theatres a matter of time and difficulty; in the case of Macedonia, such reenforcement was practically impossible save by sea. After a new survey of the situation in 1909-10 by Marshal von der Goltz it was decided to treat Macedonia as a self-contained theatre of war garrisoned at all times by a large army with Shtip (tip) as its area of war concentration, and to constitute in Thrace a covering army which would be reinforced by the troops from Asia as they successively arrived, up to the strength adequate for offensive operations against Bulgaria. To assist the defense in the first, or waiting, period Adrianople was organized as a modern fortress, and Kirk Kilisse, an upland town on the edge of the Istranja Dagh, re-equipped with barrier-forts. The line of communication with Asia was secured against the Greek fleet by the Dardanelles fortifications, which enabled Rodosto to be used as an advanced base.
The peace-time distribution of the Turkish forces in Europe (other than garrison troops) was as follows: In Thrace were the I. Ordu (Constantinople), with the I. Corps (Constantinople), II. Corps (Rodosto), III. Corps (Kirk Kilisse), and IV. Corps (Adrianople). These constituted 12 active divisions, plus, on mobilization, II first reserve divisions and 6 second reserve divisions. In Macedonia were the II. Ordu (Salonika), with the V. Corps (Salonika), VI. Corps (Monastir), VII. Corps (Uskub), and the independent 22nd Div. (Kozani), 23rd Div. (Yannina), and 24th Div. (Scutari).
These constituted 12 active divisions, plus, on mobilization, 10 first reserve divisions and 3 second reserve divisions. Administratively, the reserve formations of Smyrna, and both the active (VIII. Corps) and reserve formations of Damascus, belonged to this II. Ordu. Under favourable circumstances, and especially if Greece were neutral, these forces, totalling 3 active and 15 first reserve divisions, would be available. In the alternative, they would be available, with some delay in point of time, to reinforce the army in Thrace. The III. and IV. Ordus, with headquarters at Erzinjan and Bagdad respectively, could be grouped as an army of the Caucasus in case of a Russian war, but were practically unavailable for Europe. So also were the forces in Hejaz and Yemen, and Tripoli. Neglecting second reserve formations, therefore, the paper dispositions gave Thrace 23 and Macedonia 22 divisions, to either of which might be added a further 18. But, as usual in Turkish military history, this imposing paper total of 63 divisions represented far more than the real and available strength. Internal difficulties, low transport capabilities, and the necessity of garrisoning almost all parts of Albania and Macedonia to prevent local risings, added to the customary slackness in administration and training and the customary dishonesty in supply and equipment matters, resulted in the putting into the field of two armies which were numerically inferior, unequally trained, and poorly equipped - possessing indeed few assets beyond the solid fighting-worth of the individual Mahommedan Turk .2 With all this, however, the prestige of a great Power facing a group of small states, whose mutual hatred and rivalries had only just been composed, stood high, especially in Germany where the positive effects of the Turkish army reforms initiated by von der Goltz and others were overrated. In the Turkish army itself, confidence was unbounded: only a few had their misgivings.
The actual strengths of the two Turkish armies, owing to inexact and defective returns, cannot be stated. But it appears to be true that the Thracian army had no more than half of its nominal strength of 226,000 men, while the Macedonian army short of the VIII. Corps and the Damascus and Smyrna reserves and scattered as it was, can hardly be credited with more than 200,000 of its nominal 340,000, of whom no more than 50,000 combatants were in fact ever assembled on one battlefield.
On the side of the allies, administration being regular and sentiment uniform within each army, the paper strength and order of battle represent realities, and can be summed up thus :- Bulgarian Army: - Nine divisions (I Sofia, 2 Philippopolis, 3 Steven, 4 Shumla, 5 Ruschuk, 6 Vratsa, 7 Dupnitsa, 8 Stara Zagora, 9 Plevna) each of two brigades plus a reserve brigade formed on mobilization. (The regiments being each of 4 battalions, the infantry strength of a division was 24 battalions, i.e. that of a normal European army corps, and 22 times that of a Turkish division.), A 10th Div. and an i ith Div. were formed on mobilization out of surplus reservists and of such Macedonian volunteers as enlisted in the regular forces (these had two brigades each instead of three). There was also a cavalry division. Ration strength of the field armies, about 280,000.
Five divisions of the I. Ban and five of the II. Ban, each designated by the regional name (Danube, Morava, Drina, Shumaja, Timok and the Ban numeral, e.g. Timok I., Timok II., etc.). The infantry strength of a I. Ban division (four 4-battalion regiments) was two-thirds that of a Bulgarian division and 2 Even solidarity within the unit had been seriously shaken by the incorporation, under new conscription laws, of Christians allied in race and religion to the enemy peoples.
3 The 6th Div. had only two brigades.
not quite twice that of a Turkish. The infantry strength of II. Ban divisions varied, but was usually three 4-battalion regiments. A number of supplementary regiments were formed from excess reservists, III. Ban units, for subsidiary operations. There was a cavalry division. At the completion of mobilization the ration strength of the field forces alone, exclusive of III. Ban units, was 287,000, almost exactly io % of the population. In the whole war some 450,000 men are supposed to have been mobilized.
Greek Army': - Four active divisions of 9 - 11 battalions each (equal in number of units, and superior in effective numbers, to a Turkish division). Reserve units forming four weak divisions, each equal to two-thirds of a normal division. One cavalry brigade. Ration strength of the field army, about I Io,000.
A militia organized in four divisions of varying strength. Approximate total of field troops 47,000. With regard to the proportioning of effort between the two theatres of war, contemporary military opinion, impressed by a sort of primacy which Bulgaria assumed in the league, by the more regular character of her army and her civil administration, and by the nearness of Constantinople to her eastern frontier, argued a priori that Thrace was not only the" principal "theatre, but the single important theatre in which practically all military effort should have been concentrated by both sides - a judgment which ignored the relation of strategy to war policy, and one for which in the sequel Bulgaria was destined to pay heavil y. For the objective of the war was Macedonia, as von der Goltz had foreseen in 1909 when he increased both the present and the potential strength of the Turkish forces allotted to that theatre. And when conquered, Macedonia would be conquered once and for all, for the possibility of a Turkish counter-offensive to recover the lost province was excluded by the Greek navy as effectually as the possibility of reinforcing Tripoli had been excluded by the Italian navy in 1911. A further important consideration for the allies was the obscurity of the ethnographi.c lines in central Macedonia. Here the population was neither definitely Bulgarian nor definitely Serbian, and unless the two allies concerned were both represented in the conquering army the absent member would certainly suffer when it came to drawing the frontier-line.
On the other hand, each of the allies had special objects which might, and in some cases did, conflict with the common object. Bulgaria cherished ambitions in Thrace which extended even to Constantinople, and she had to consider the fact that sooner or later the Turkish forces in Thrace would be reenforced not only by their own allotted reserves but also by those, above alluded to, which the Greek navy prevented from going to Macedonia. Further, Bulgaria coveted not only a coast-line on the Aegean but the great port of Salonika itself.
Serbia, on her side, had to consider not only central Macedonia but northern Macedonia and the Sanjak of Novibazar. These provinces would infallibly revolt against the Turkish authority as soon as the Turkish forces withdrew to concentrate for battle in the S., and unless bona fide troops of the Serbian Government came to occupy the countr y, a state of disorder would arise that would equally certainly invite Austrian intervention.' Further, Serbia was determined to carve for herself a way to the Adriatic through northern Albania. Greece for her part had a minor objective in Epirus - a region of which the northern limit was vague - and as a major objective Salonika and the Aegean littoral beyond, not to mention more remote objects in Asia Minor.
Montenegro's aims were limited to local expansion southward into Albania and eastward into the Sanjak of Novibazar and northern Macedonia; in both of these directions some conflict of interest with the Serbian Government might arise.
All these things were, in their varying degrees, elements of policy upon which the Allied strategy must base itself if its war aims were to be obtained, and accordingly the military treaty between Bulgaria and Serbia provided for a Serbo-Bulgarian army of 7 Serbian and 3 Bulgarian divisions to invade Macedonia, moving concentrically against the front Uskub - Kumanovo - Kratovo - Kochana, forming the outer contour of the plain known as Ovche Polye which was assumed on both sides to be the natural concentration area of the Turks.
If the road system was judged by the staffs sufficient to permit of the augmentation of the left wing, this was to be made up of 2 Serbian and 3 Bulgarian divisions - a force equivalent to to Turkish divisions, while the other 5 Serbian divisions (equal to about 8 Turkish) descended from Vranya upon Kumanovo. If not, the central mass of 5 Serbian divisions was to be flanked on the N. by 2 divisions moving by the Kara Dagh on Uskub and on the S. by the 1 The navy consisted of the" Georgios Averof,"a powerful armoured cruiser, 3 old coastal battleships practically modernized, and 16 modern destroyers and other torpedo craft, including a submarine; as against the Turkish strength of 3 small battleships (ex-German), one modernized coastal battleship, 2 light cruisers and 20 effective destroyers and torpedo boats.
2 The relations of Serbia and Montenegro were not such that the Serbian Government could easily hand over to Montenegro the entire responsibility for the conquest of the north.
3 Bulgarian divisions advancing on the front Kratovo - Kochana. In both cases the envelopment of all the forces that the Turks could gather for battle was the object aimed at. It provided also that if the military situation in Thrace required it, troops not indispensable in Macedonia might be transferred thither, and vice versa.
The balance of the Serbian forces (about 3 divisions) were at the free disposal of their Government, and in fact were intended for the conquest of the Sanjak of Novibazar.
The 6 (or 7) Bulgarian divisions remaining were to form the army destined for Thrace.
The role of Greece, when she acceded to the league, was by offensive operations from Thessaly to bind as many hostile troops as possible, incidentally occupying the country which it was intended to acquire. The Greek navy was to close the Aegean to Turkish transports. A minor Greek force in the Epirus theatre, and the Montenegrins in northern Albania, were similarly to absorb the attention of the Turkish garrisons (3 independent divisions) and to conquer territory.
On the very eve of operations, however, a drastic change was made (Sept. 28) at the instance of Bulgaria. Instead of 3 divisions, I only was to operate in Macedonia, and this was directed to move independently from Dupnitsa in the direction of Seres and Salonika. The striking wing of the allied army - that which, directed upon Shtip, would have come in upon the rear of the Turkish positions on the Ovche Polye - was thereby deprived of a force of about 80,000 men. And Bulgaria, by evading at the last moment an obligation that was not merely part of a military scheme but was included in the basic political treaty of Feb. 29 1912, set up at once an atmosphere of friction which was not likely to help her in her claims to the doubtful districts of Macedonia. Serbia, submitting rather than agreeing, redistributed her forces, and the strategic deployment and order of battle actually carried out was as follows: - Commander-in-chief, King Peter Chief of the general staff, Gen. Putnik II. Army Gen. Stepanovich Timok I. 3 and Army (28,000 ration troops.
strength) I. Army Crown Prince Morava I., Drina I., Alexander Danube I., Danube (126,000 ration II., Timok II., Cay.
strength) Div., Army troops.
III. Army Gen. Yankovich Shumaja I., Morava II., (67,000 ration Drina II., Morava Bri strength) gade, Army troops.
Ibar Force Gen. Zhivkovich Shumaja II., Army (18,000 combatants) troops.
Yavor Brigade Col. Angelkovich (I mixed brigade). (9,000 combatants) The I. Army was cantoned in the Morava valley, about Vranya, with outposts on the frontier. The II. Army on its left (now reduced to one division) was concentrated along with the 7th Bulgarian Div. about Kyustendil, and the III. Army on its right, behind the frontier, on the various mountain routes E. and N. of Prishtina. The Ibar Force lay on the river of that name, just inside Serbian territory, opposite Novibazar. The Yavor Brigade was temporarily held back facing the Serbo - Bosnian frontier. The intention was that the III. Army should advance first and make good possession of Prishtina, and then turn S., leaving one division to hold the captured territory, and with the remainder advance rapidly S. through the Kachanik defile on Uskub, the unattached brigade meantime opening up communication over the Kara Dagh with the Central (I.) Army. This would have initially the difficult task of debouching from the narrow front of the Morava valley, while the sole remaining unit of the II. Army was to advance by Egri Palanka towards Kratovo.
The Ibar Force, and eventually the Yavor Brigade also, were to clear the Sanjak of Novibazar of Turkish garrisons and Albanian bands. The Montenegrins were to cooperate to some extent in this task, but their main effort was to be directed against Scutari.
Mobilization began in all the countries affected on Sept. 30 - Oct. I. Montenegro was the first to declare war, on Oct. 8. Ignoring the declaration of the Great Powers that" under no circumstances would they agree to any change in the status quo in S.E. Europe,"the other three members of the league presented a joint ultimatum on Oct. 13. Turkey rejected this on the 15th, and on the 17th war was declared. By that date the movements of strategic concentration were nearly complete, and several frontier skirmishes had already taken place.
II. The Campaigns in Macedonia and the West. - On Oct. 20, while the Serbian I. and II. Armies closed up on their advanced elements (the I. clearing some high ground beyond the frontier to facilitate the next day's work), the III., which had the greatest distance to cover, marched in several columns on Prishtina. Irregular fighting on difficult ground brought the army close to Prishtina by the 22nd, and the Turks evacuated the town on the evening of that day.
On Oct. 21, the I. Army advanced in three columns: Morava I., Timok II. on the right, with flank guards in the Kara Dagh, fol The 7th Bulgarian Div. was nominally under the orders of this army, but in fact obeyed orders only from the Bulgarian headquarters.
lowed the Moravitsa valley; Danube I. and Danube II., on the left that of the Pcinja; while Drina I. moved along the watershed between these rivers. The cavalry division was kept back till the infantry should have gained ground in the plain. The II. Army moved on the same day, but very slowly, along the KyustendilEgri-Palanka road, with instructions to advance thence both on Stratsin (Stracin) and on Kratovo, gaining touch with the I. Army W. of the former place. Bulgarian coOperation was limited to a movement by one brigade over the mountains towards the upper Bregalnitsa. The rest of the 7th Div. frankly began its march over Jumaya Pass into the Struma valley, heading for Seres.
That evening, without having obtained touch either with the II. or the III. Armies, the I. Army halted on the line TabanovcheStar-Nagorichino, disposed in depth and entrenched, with orders to stand fast on the 22nd and wait developments on its flanks. Resistance so far had been slight, but on the 22nd Turkish forces of some strength were reported at Kumanovo.
The Ovche Polye was, after all, not to play the part of Koniggratz. At first, it seems, the Goltz plan of a defensive concentration there, to be followed by radial attacks on divided enemies, was adhered to by the Turks. But when at the last moment it became clear that the Bulgarian effort was concentrated on Thrace, `Ali Riza Pasha, commander-in-chief in the Macedonian theatre, was ordered to take the offensive. Zekki Pasha, in charge of the three corps grouped in the Vardar region, was at once directed by `Ali Riza to move forward against the Serbians as they debouched from the mountains.
Of `Ali Riza's 25 divisions, 3 were scattered between Prishtina and the Austrian frontier, 31 at Scutari, z at Dibra, and i at Prizren; 2 opposing the Greek main army in Thessaly and 2 the Greek secondary army in Epirus; 3 in the Struma valley and i guarding the railway between Veles and Salonika, making, in all, 16 which were totally unavailable for battle in the decisive theatre.' Of the remaining 9, i was at Prishtina, 2 in the valleys of the Bregalnitsa and the Zletovska facing Kochana and Kratovo, and 6, forming the main group under Zekki, advanced across the Ovche Polye on the 21st and 22nd, the V. Corps then halting N. of Novoselyani, the VI.
N. of Slatina and the VII. N. and N.E. of Kumanovo.
Viewed as a whole, `Ali Riza's forces, scattered as they inevitably were through the need of holding territory, were reasonably well distributed, in that, though the Turks were in the ensemble inferior in the ratio of I to 21, their handicap on the decisive battlefield reduced itself to the ratio of t to about II-. Had still further economies been practised (in the Struma valley for instance) this handicap might have disappeared. But uncertainty as to Bulgarian movements and dispositions was not yet cleared up. In any case, the seizure of the initiative at a moment when the Serbian I. Army was still cramped and out of touch with its neighbours went far to neutralize the numerical disadvantage.
As a matter of fact, Zekki intended to use the day of the 23rd for closing up his columns and narrowing his front; and, Prince Alexander's intentions being the same, the day would have been uneventful but for the initiatives of subordinates on both sides.
The Serbian Danube I. Div., on the evening of the 22nd, had been tempted to go forward, out of alignment, by the evident tactical advantages of a position farther south. On the morning of the 23rd it was formed in an arc facing S. and S.W., with its left flank on the Pcinja, near Voynik, its centre looking towards Slatina and its right on hill 650, and in that position it was attacked by the heads of 4 Turkish divisions. A fierce battle raged all day on this front, while the other 2 Turkish divisions (VII. Corps) engaged Morava I., N. of Kumanovo with indecisive results, and the remaining Serbian ' These outlying divisions are catalogued here as such. But their strengths were in reality very unequal.
divisions, Drina I. in the centre, Timok II. behind the right and Danube II. behind the left, remained practically inactive, partly in ignorance of what was taking place (the Army Command itself was in the like case), partly because strict orders had been given to stand fast during the 23rd. Only Drina I. came into action towards evening, and the situation was critical when fighting died away and army headquarters at last became aware of the facts. During the night the remaining divisions were urged forward to the battlefield.
Next day they came progressively into action. The stubborn resistance of Danube I. had shaken the attacking power of two-thirds of Zekki's force, and the intervention of Danube II. and the Serbian cavalry division on the 24th completed the work, after hard fighting beyond the Pcinja. And when a few advanced troops of the II. Army from Egri Palanka reached the outskirts of the battlefield, the V. and VI. Turkish Corps, fearing to be enveloped, retreated southward into the Ovche Polye. In the centre, Drina I. drove forward far into the weakest part of the enemy's system. On the Serbian right, the Turkish positions between Cerno Polye and Lipkovo in the foothills of the Kara Dagh fell to the attack of Morava I. and Timok II. in the afternoon. With a loss of some 4,500 killed and wounded (nearly half of these in Danube I.), the Serbians had won the first great battle of the campaign. But it was not a bataille sans lendemain as the Serbo-Bulgarian convention had intended it to be. Neither the III. Army, which coming in from Prishtina was still two days' marches distant, nor the II., which consisted effectively of one division only, could help to make it so. And in consequence no real pursuit was made, the I. Army halting and entrenching on the ground it had gained. Actually, a pursuit would have closed the campaign, for the Turkish retreat had converted itself into a rout. Even Uskub was evacuated, and the force barring the Kachanik defile against the III. Serbian Army withdrawn.
For some days the Serbian G.H.Q. continued to keep a tight rein on its armies, grouping them principally for a battle against the" Turkish main army "presumed to be about Veles-Shtip. The cavalry division advanced to St. Nicholas, a point equidistant from these two towns, while Timok I. (II. Army) passed Kratovo and moved on Cerni Vzh, which was not captured till the 26th. The I. Army followed carefully to the latitude of Gradishte, while the III., parts of which - for the sake of earlier contact with the I. - had used routes E. of Kachanik that had now become eccentric, moved up slowly on its right. Drina II. was left at Prishtina to secure the country and cooperate with the Ibar Force, while Uskub was held by Morava I. So difficult was the country and so imperfect the liaisons that it was not till the 2gth that the deployment of the I., II. and III. Armies across the Ovche Polye was complete.
By that time the Turks had long evacuated the right bank of the Vardar. The remains of the VII. Corps from Uskub had gone to Tetovo and part of the V. Corps had retreated down the Vardar, but the bulk of the V. and VI. Corps had retired through Veles towards Monastir and were preparing to offer a new resistance in the Babuna Pass.
But the Serbian G.H.Q. had now gleaned many details of the Turkish rout, and, assuming Zekki's army to be reduced to a remnant which could be crushed between a single Serbian army and the Greeks, it made entirely new dispositions on the 29th. To aid the Bulgarians in the siege of Adrianople, it sent the II. Army, and actually added to it Danube II. in replacement of the Bulgarian 7th Div. which continued its way down the Struma.
To penetrate Albania and gain the desired foothold on the coast, the III. Army (reduced to Drina II. and Shumaja I. and army troops) was sent eastward on Oct. 31.
The I. Army, now consisting of Morava I., Drina I., Danube I., Timok II., Morava II. and the Morava Brigade, was to pursue the Turkish army and complete its ruin, in cooperation with the Greeks. Meantime, the conquest of the Sanjak of Novibazar and of northern Kosovo had been practically completed. From Oct. 10, Montenegrin forces under Gen. Vukovich had been operating from the inner part of their country towards Plevlye, Byelopolye, Berane, and Gusinye. On the 19th, the Ibar Force under Zhivkovich (Shumaja II.) had advanced in several columns which, with more or less irregular fighting and one or two critical moments, had converged on the town of Novibazar and captured the Turkish works on the surrounding heights by the evening of the 22nd. On the 23rd, Novibazar was occupied, and the work of hunting down the dispersed enemy and their Arnaut auxiliaries began. On the 28th a force from Novibazar, in concert with a detachment of the III. Army from Prishtina, captured Mitrovitsa. In the extreme N. the few Turkish troops available were forced, under pressure from the Montenegrins and the Serbian Yavor Brigade, to concentrate at Plevlye; there they were attacked on the 29th and driven over the Austrian border. On the 30th Ipek (Pech) fell to the Montenegrin southern columns. Thenceforward the troops in these regions were only employed on police duties; but their withdrawal to other theatres of war was, in view of a possible intervention by Austria-Hungary, considered undesirable. The Greek campaign opened on Oct. 18. The 4 active divisions of the Greek army and 3 of the new divisions (5th, 6th, 7th) formed the main army in Thessaly under the Crown Prince Constantine, whose chief-of-staff was Gen. Danglis. The 8th and 9th Divs., composed almost entirely of reservists and volunteers, constituted the Epirus Army under Sapundjakis.
Turkish attacks Turkish corps V Serbian troops - ¦ /?
The Turkish force opposing each of these amounted to about 2 divisions. So small an allotment on the Thessaly front can only be explained on the assumption that the Turks supposed the Greeks to be at the same level of efficiency as in 1897. If so, they were deceived. From Trikkala the Greek 5th Div. moved on Diskata and the upper valley of the Vistritsa. Two divisions (2nd and 3rd) advanced into the salient W. of Tyrnavos and occupied Damasuli, and moved N. to clear the way for the 1st and 4th Divs., which from Tyrnavos moved directly on Elassona by the Meluna Pass. The 6th and 7th Divs., still imperfectly organized, followed on in second line.
On the 19th Elassona was captured with little difficulty, the main Turkish position lying farther N. in the defile of Sarandoporon which traverses the mountains lying between the Xeria and the Vistritsa basins. On the 10th and 21st, the Greek divisions, which had converged on Elassona for the battle that had been expected there, were redeployed, and on the 23rd the attack was delivered by all five. The 5th from Diskata and the 4th from the Xeria, uniting in the Vistritsa valley, marched on Serfije, throwing out a flank guard to Grevena, while the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divs. attacked the defile frontally and threatened its rear by way of Vlaholivadia. The much smaller Turkish force was routed with a loss of 20 guns and many prisoners, and (what was more important) the Greek army gained self-confidence as well as local victory, at a cost of some 1,300 casualties. Part of the beaten force retreated from Koziani on Monastir, the remainder on Verria, and the Crown Prince occupied Koziani on the 25th.
In view of the urgency of occupying Salonika before the Bulgarians arrived, the Crown Prince decided to leave only flank guards (5th Div. N. of Koziani and light troops N. of Grevena) facing the Monastir direction, while the remainder, reenforced by the 6th Div., pushed on to Verria, and the 7th Div. worked along the coast towards Katerini. These moves were successfully carried out; the 7th Div. gaining touch with the fleet on the 28th, occupied Eleutherochori and there created a new base, while from Verria the main army turned sharp N. and seized Vodena, the 5th Div. at the same time advancing to Banitsa by Khailar. This ingenious manoeuvre placed the five divisions of the main body on interior lines with a base on the sea and a strategic flank guard on either hand (Nov. 1). But the situation was nevertheless critical for the Greeks, for Hasan Tahsin had drawn in forces from the Struma valley and was in position facing W. at Yenije Vardar, while Djavid Pasha at Monastir had assembled an effective force from troops that had come in both from the Kumanovo and the Sarandoporon battlefields, and was moving out to attack the 5th Division. The Serbian cavalry descending the Vardar had not yet passed the defile of Demir Kapu, the Serbian armies were being rearranged for the new movements above detailed, and even the I. Army was scarcely beginning its movements against the Babuna Pass. As to the Bulgarian 7th Div., the last thing desired by the Greek headquarters was an energetic advance of this force to forestall them at Salonika.
On Nov. 2 and 3, while Constantine attacked the Yenije Vardar position without success, Djavid fell upon the 5th Div. and drove it with heavy losses to Khailar. Simultaneously, the Greeks from Grevena, who had reached Kastoria, were forced back. But on the 4th, before these flank guards had been sufficiently beaten, the 7th Div. from Eleutherochori had forced the passage of the Kara Azmak and were threatening to interpose between Hasan Tahsin and Salonika. A renewed frontal attack at the opportune moment broke into his position at Yenije Vardar, and, threatened on all sides, the Turks withdrew into Salonika, where their commander and 29,000 men surrendered to Constantine on the 9th.
Next day the 7th Bulgarian Div. 1 arrived and claimed the city for Bulgaria. An open rupture between the allies was only avoided by the establishment of a condominium. The Greek army was then regrouped. The 1st, 2nd and 7th Divs. remaining for political reasons E. of the Vardar, the 3rd, 4th and 6th Divs. were concentrated at Vodena, with the 5th at Khailar and the Grevena force on the Kastoria road, in readiness for an advance on Monastir in concert with the Serbian I. Army.
This army had begun its advance on the mountains surrounding the basin of Monastir on Nov. I, Morava I. and Drina I. moving directly from Veles, and Danube I. from Shtip by Krivolak 2 on Prilep, while Morava II. from Tetovo marched S. on Gostivar. On the Prilep and Kichevo routes respectively, the Turkish V. and VII. Corps were rallied to dispute the passes while the VI. Corps assembled at Monastir.3 The forcing of the Babuna Pass above Prilep .was a long and difficult business, which fell on the central column alone, as Danube I. and Timok II. had to await bridging equipment before they could cross the Vardar. It was not until Nov. 5 that Prilep was reached, ' This, as has been mentioned already, moved down the Struma valley, with a detachment on that of the Bregalnitsa. The latter rejoined by way of Strumitsa, in the last days of October. Another detachment by the Mesta valley, marched on Drama. These columns met with no serious resistance.
Whence the cavalry with infantry support was sent to seize Demir Kapu.
Part of this force took a share in the attack on the 5th Greek Div. at Banitsa.
and then a further pause was thought necessary to reassemble the units, scattered by mountain fighting, as well as to allow the two flank columns to come up. On the same day, however, hearing of the crisis on the Greek front, and arguing that it was both necessary to relieve pressure on the 5th Greek Div. and also possible to advance without undue risk against the Turks remaining in front of Monastir, the Serbian G.H.Q. ordered a tentative offensive towards Alince. This, carried out on the 6th by a part of Drina I., soon developed into an unintended battle, in which Morava I. and the cavalry division' were called on to join. But the result of a day's fighting, which was marked by initiative and combination of effort in the subordinate commanders, was to hustle the Turkish V. Corps back to the environs of Monastir. A rash advance of the two divisions into the midst of the enemy was only prevented by stringent orders from G.H.Q. to halt and await the coming of the two flank columns. Of these, Morava II. had successfully driven back the Turks from Kichevo on Nov. 5, but was obliged to halt in order to organize its line of supply Gostivar-Tetovo-Uskub, and the left column was only just beginning the passage of the Vardar at Krivolak. Still doubtful of the real situation on the Greek front, Prince Alexander, in agreement with Putnik, was determined not to fight the battle of Monastir till he should have all his forces in hand.
The assembly of the forces for battle on the line MramoritsanPodine - Dobrusovo was to be completed for Nov. 14.
The Turks also prepared for battle. Leaving only a few troops in front of Verria and of the Greek 5th Div. and Grevena force, Djavid Pasha brought back the rest of the VI. Corps to join `Ali Riza at Monastir, where what remained of the V. and VII. were concentrated. The total combatant strength was about 40,000. The position taken up lay S. of the line of the Semnitsa and thence along the marshy bank of the Cerna, its eastern half lying on the plain and its western half on the heights. The V. Corps occupied the plain from opposite Novak to Kikuricani, with its centre of gravity on the Prilep road.' The VII. Corps occupied the mountain sector; and the V. Corps was in reserve at Monastir.
The Serbian plan was to attack the Kikuricani front and the heights abutting on the plain with Morava I. on the right and Drina I. on the left, to attack and outflank the Turkish left wing on the mountains by means of Morava II. which was coming down from Kichevo, and to do the same on the right of the defence with Danube I. and the cavalry division operating at and S. of Novak. Timok II. was to be in reserve behind the centre. The necessity of maintaining at all costs the single supply route of the army - that through Prilep to points on the Uskub-Salonika railway - no doubt imposed a plan of battle that was to all intents and purposes frontal, for the projected movements of cavalry on Resna and over the Cerna could hardly be regarded as serious attempt at envelopment.
The battle, projected for Nov. 14, was ordered to be postponed till the 17th. But on the 15th, as the divisions were getting into position, part of Morava II., carried away by its own ardour, launched a night attack on height 1,150 S. of the Semnitsa. The enemy was well prepared, position after position had to be stormed and it was not till the afternoon of the 16th that the detachment secured the height, at the cost of heavy losses. Meantime the rest of the army, according to orders, was merely making its final reconnaissances. On the 17th, the four battalions of Morava II. had to resist, still without help from the rest of the army, a series of heavy counter-attacks delivered by the VI. Turkish Corps under the energetic Djavid.5 The battle of Monastir, which was finally launched on the whole front on the 18th, will long be studied for its tactical incidents, but as an ensemble it is sufficiently described by saying that the resistance of the half division of Morava II. absorbed so much of the 4 Which had been relieved on the Vardar b y Timok II.
5 Morava I., however, sent some reinforcements on the afternoon of this day.
fighting effort of Zekki's i reserves that the frontal attack of Morava I. and Drina I. succeeded with little difficulty.
Threatened by the Greeks - now again advancing on Florinaand pursued on front and flank by the converging divisions on the battlefield itself, the Turkish army broke up entirely. Half of it was killed, wounded or captured, the other half, in units or small parties, made its way to the only friendly stronghold now remaining openYannina (Janina) in Epirus. The victory was completely decisive, and all that remained for the allies to do in the western theatre was to carry out the march to the sea, to occupy and police the region of Okhrida-Dibra-Elbasan, to reduce the two fortresses of Scutari and Yannina (the last refuges of Turkish authority), to ensure against Austrian intervention (for which purpose the main body of the I. Army was moved back to Uskub after a few days' rest) - and to come to an agreement amongst themselves as to the division of the spoil.
On Dec. 3, Serbia and Montenegro joined in the armistice signed that day between Bulgaria and Turkey. Operations in Macedonia and northern Albania therefore came to an end. Greece, however, did not sign, and continued her operations, though these were in the nature of exploitation rather than of fresh effort, except in Epirus, where operations against Yannina were in progress.
Owing to the necessity of garrisoning Epirus, the Turks had normally maintained two divisions in this theatre. These, and the nature of the country were quite sufficient to make the progress of the Greek secondary army (Gen. Sapundzakis, 8th and 9th Divs., both newly formed) a slow and difficult matter. From the opening of hostilities to Nov. 3, the Greeks were employed in clearing the Luros and Prevesa region. This done, the formidable Pentepigadia defile was attacked, and after four days' fighting cleared (Nov. 8). Sapundzakis then advanced to the outskirts of the fortress of Yannina (Nov. 10), while a column of irregulars from Metsovo in Thessaly and another small detachment from Santi Quaranta came in on his flanks to assist in establishing a loose blockade. But this was the limit of his offensive possibilities, and the weather presently brought operations to a close for the time being.
During the winter, however, the greater part of the field army which had completed its task in Macedonia was brought round by sea via Salonika. Active operations began afresh in the early spring. With adequate numbers and material resources, the Crown Prince was able to deliver a successful general assault on March 5 1913, and the Turkish garrison, numbering about 30,000, wounded and unwounded, surrendered next day.
No further fighting occurred in the Albanian theatre, though the Greeks on the S. and the Serbians in the N.E. attempted without success to round up the few Turkish forces, rallied by Djavid, which had escaped from the catastrophes of Monastir and Yannina.
III. The Campaign in Thrace. - Through the change of plan which Bulgaria forced upon her ally on Sept. 28, Thrace became for the public, military and non-military alike, the principal theatre of war. Nevertheless, the actual plan of campaign of the Bulgarians still remains obscure - all that is known being the fact that the first successes caused it to be abandoned. On the Turkish side, equally little is known with certainty as to the original project, though it is probably safe to say that this consisted in a defensive concentration of the I., II. and IV. Corps on the line of the Ergene and of the III. Corps at or in rear of Kirk Kilisse, with the fortress of Adrianople and the works of Kirk Kilisse acting as breakwaters in front. The scheme, whatever it was, was abandoned at the last moment in favour of a general offensive, as in Macedonia. In these conditions, the facts must interpret themselves, at any rate in the initial stages.
Leaving the 7th Div. on the Macedonian side, the Bulgarians formed three armies between Philippopolis, Trnovo-Seimen, and Yamboli, the latter with especial precautions of secrecy. The II. Army (Gen. Ivanov) on the right, concentrated the 8th and 9th Divs. about Trnovo-Seimen, and the 2nd between Philippopolis and Haskovo. The I. Army in the centre (Gen. Kutinchev) concentrated between Nova Zagora and Kizil Aghach, consisted of the 1st, 3rd and (newly formed) 10th Divisions. The III. Army (Gen. Radko Dimitriev) on the left, or rather the left rear, about Yamboli, consisted of the 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions. In front of it was the cavalry division, with its main body in line with the main body of the I. Army. The 11th Div. was still in process of formation at Philippopolis.
On the day after war was declared, the ensemble, whatever the objects of its movement may have been, began to move - the I. and III. Armies southward and the II. south-westward on Mustafa Pasha (8th and 9th Divs.) and due S. on Kirjali (2nd Div.). Siege artillery was entrained at Sofia for Trnovo-Seimen on the 17th. On the 19th, the 8th Div. on the right of the Maritsa, and the 9th on the left, seized Mustafa Pasha, continuing their progress on the loth. On that day, the 2nd Div. reached Kirjali on the Arda, while the I. Army crossed the frontier-3rd Div. on both sides of the Tunja, 1st Div. on its left, and 10th in rear, all moving due south. On the 21st and 22nd the same movements continued, while the III. Army in its turn entered Turkey at Ojakoi and Topchular, and the 2nd Div. turned E.S.E., heading for Demotika.
1 'Ali Riza had left Monastir, and Zekki was in general command on the field.
On the 22nd the first serious engagements took place in front of Adrianople. That fortress, with modernized permanent works, and a main defence line studded with infantry redoubts farther out and a full interval-organization, had a very considerable perimeter. It was naturally divided by its four water-courses (Upper Maritsa, Arda, Lower Maritsa, Tunja) into four sectors. On the Lower Maritsa-Tunja sector the 3rd Div. of the I. Army was advancing on the Tunja-Upper Maritsa, the 8th Div. (II. Army); and on the Upper Maritsa-Arda front the 9th, also of the II. Army. The last named, advancing S.E. from Kadikoi and Buldurkoi was violently counter-attacked. Each side extended southward in search of the other's flank till the Arda was approached. But the combat was really decided by the intervention of the 8th Div. artillery on the other side of the Maritsa. Enfiladed, the Turks retired to their prepared line. Counter-attacks on the 3rd Div. moving down E. of the Tunja had the same result. Thus the process of investing Adrianople began at the very outset, three out of eight divisions available in the theatre of war being employed in it.
In the Tunja-Upper Maritsa sector the principal work of the main line was a group formed round Chiftlik-Ekmechikoi which has been compared to a" Feste."A group of the same character (Papas Tepe) occupied the ridge between Upper Maritsa and Arda, a fortified village barred the Ortakoi road in the Arda valley itself, and a third" Feste "had been constructed on Kartal Tepe. Similar groups of works at Pashachajir and Gunes Chiftlik continue the line of defence between Lower Maritsa and Tunja, merging in the line of the old permanent works at Fort Kuru Cheshme. The operations round Adrianople will be summarized later.
The movement of the I. Army brought only its 3rd Div. directly into contact with the Adrianople defences, the remainder (still with the 10th Div. in rear) aiming at the line Deremanlia-Kukiler. On its left the cavalry division, after several engagements on the 19th, 10th and 21st about Vaisa and Tashli-Muselim, found itself strongly opposed at and E. of Seliolu on the 22nd, on which day also the leading troops of the 1st Div. came in contact with important Turkish forces in front of Seliolu and Gechkenlia. At this time the 3rd Div. was fighting astride the Tunja at Biiyiik-Sinailcha-MurajilarTau san-Ortakj i.
Instead of concentrating behind the Ergene, the Turks were in fact advancing northward to battle in accordance with the same general order that had sent Zekki to Kumanovo. The army in Thrace, commanded by Abdalla Pasha under the higher direction of Nazim Pasha, the Minister of War, consisted of the I., II., III. and IV. active corps and of a number of reserve divisions which were only assembled slowly, forming a XV., XVI., XVII. and XVIII. Corps.
The original concentration points were for the I. Corps Yenije and Kavakli, for the III. Corps, II. Corps and IV. Corps (in that order from N. to S.) the zone Bunar Hissar-Lule Burgas, for the XV. Corps (garrison) Adrianople, while the XVI. Corps was to hold the middle Ergene and the XVII. and XVIII. Corps to constitute themselves behind Lule Burgas. In reality the assembly of the four active corps took place at Kirk Kilisse (III.), Yenije and Kavakli (I.), Karali (II.), and Ha y sa and Kuleli (IV.), with a cavalry division in frontof the centre.
At Adrianople, the XV. Corps was duly formed but the XVI., XVII., XVIII. were far in rear and in an embryonic condition, the XVI. indeed never being formed as such.
From these positions the four corps advanced on the 21st and 22nd in accordance with the order to take the offensive, and two encounterbattles ensued, one of which, the engagement of the Bulgarian I. Army, is generally called the Battle of Seliolu, while the other, the first conflict of Radko Dimitriev's III. Army with Mahmud Mukhtar's III. Corps, bears the name of Kirk Kilisse.
The front of the Battle of Seliolu is defined, roughly, by the line Keremetlia - N. of Seliolu - N. of Gechkenlia - S. of Erjali-OrtakjiKaipa - (at which point it joins the front of the 3rd Div. beginning the envelopment of Adrianople). Heavy fighting on the 22nd and 23rd (of which the most notable incident was a night-attack that r + I .
penetrated the Turkish front between Gechkenlia and Seliolu) brought the Bulgarian army victoriously to the Deremanlia-KukilerGerdeli road by morning on the 24th. The Turks had disappeared. Owing to events on their right, they had given up their somewhat disjointed efforts to defeat the Bulgarian centre, and retired in a direction or directions which the victors were unable to determine.
Kirk Kilisse was a route-centre of importance, with a line of barrier works, partly permanent, on its N. side. Von der Goltz had intended that it should play the same part on the right flank as Adrianople on the left. Although the permanent works were few, and inferior to those of the great fortress, the natural positions afforded by spurs of the Istranja Balkan gave the place advantages of site which were lacking at Adrianople. The Bulgarians, on their side, allocated a whole army to the task of dealing with it, by investment, brusque assault or regular siege, or a combination of those methods.
Partly in order to develop the necessary frontage from the outset (in case of battle between Kirk Kilisse and the frontier), and partly in order to utilize the routes to the best advantage in a country much more difficult than that traversed by the other armies, Radko Dimitriev had formed his two leading divisions into four brigade columns - (a) a 4th Div. from Ojakoi on Keremetlia (liaison with I. Army); (b) 4th Div., followed by part of 6th Div. by Devletli Aghach and Eski Polos on Petra; (c) 3 of 5th Div. with remainder of 6th Div. from Malkochlar by Erikler on Raklitsa and Kirk Kilisse; (d) a of 5th Div. from Topchular by Almajik on Kadikoi. Of these columns (a) became involved in the Seliolu fighting, and took no part in that of Kirk Kilisse.
Columns (a) and (b), forming the strongest part of the army, and also column (c) soon met with strong resistance (morning 22nd), and the country, the weather (stormy since the 20th) and tactical incidents making progress uneven, the front at nightfall of the 22nd was very sinuous, the Turks holding pronounced salients at Eski Polos, and .also at Almajik, while the Bulgarians had penetrated nearly to Kadikoi in the centre and within 2 m. of Petra on their right. On the 23rd, however. continued pressure on the Kadikoi and Petra fronts forced the Turks to evacuate their salients, and at night the Bulgarian line, with its flanks somewhat advanced, ran roughly E.W. from the heights S.S.W. of Petra, through that village, to. height 1,506 N. of Akmacha and thence some distance south-east. From this line, in the night, assaults by parts of the two left columns (5th Div.) penetrated to Karakoi on the one hand and halfway to Raklitsa on the other. And thereupon, worn out by two days' hill fighting and lacking in internal homogeneity, Mahmud Mukhtar's Corps broke up, abandoning Kirk Kilisse and its fortifications, and streamed away in panic. The Bulgarians entered Kirk Kilisse on the 24th and possessed themselves of immense booty, including 55 guns.
Mystified and ignorant of the line of retreat of the enemy, both the I. and III. Armies stood fast on the 24th on their respective battlefields, while the cavalry division was sent out due south. On the 25th the horsemen reached the Constantinople railway at Baba Eski; next, pushing reconnaissances S. and S.E., they found the country S. of the Ergene all clear, but hostile forces between Lule Burgas and Muradli. At the same time the divisional cavalry of the 5th Div. from Kirk Kilisse appears to have established the presence of enemy forces at or near Bunar Hissar.
This information, showing that the Ergene line had been abandoned, and that Abdalla was regrouping his forces and assembling his incoming reserve divisions in the Lule Burgas-Vaisa region, involved a complete change of front for the Bulgarians. Hitherto facing S., they had now to face E., pivoting on the 5th Div. at Kirk Kilisse. And while the necessary movements were being carried out, Abdalla again took the offensive, with the reorganized four active corps, and the XVII. and XVIII. Corps of new formation.
On the 27th the Bulgarian wheel began, but instead of its being carried out on a fixed pivot, the pivot itself was allowed to advance eastward, so that, instead of presenting a united line, the Bulgarians formed a loose echelon, left in advance, which led to successive instead of simultaneous engagements. On the evening of that day, the Turkish III. Corps (Mahmud Mukhtar) on the right, was on the road between Vaisa and Bunar Hissar, the II. at Kara Aghach, the I. at Turk Bey and the IV. partly at Lule Burgas, partly at Sakiskoi, the total front between the Ergene and the mountains being about 45 miles. The two new corps were a march in rear. A general offensive had been ordered.
On the 28th, as a natural consequence, an encounter battle began just E. of the Kara Aghach, in the forest of Sujak, between Mahmud Mukhtar's troops and the Bulgarian 5th Div., the latter finally drawing back behind the stream and occupying a line from Chiftlik Teke on the left to Mura Aghach on the right. Thereupon the various Bulgarian columns echeloned back to the right of this division, hastened their march, and part of the 3rd Div. from the Adrianople region was ordered up to support the 5th directly, which by a heavy forced march it was able to do on the evening of the 29th.' On the other side, confusion in the command and other causes made the general advance slow and disjointed; the initiative was soon lost, and the battle became one of the parallel fronts along the 1 This is all the more remarkable as the Bulgarian I. Army's movements were hampered by fears of a crisis at Adrianople, where a serious sortie-battle was being fought at the time.
Kara Aghach. On the 29th (afternoon) the 4th Bulgarian Div. followed by the 6th were already on that line. On the 30th, the crisis of the battle, the I. Bulgarian Army came into action opposite Lule Burgas (1st Div.) and on and S. of the Ergene (loth Div.), while the cavalry returning from Rodosto formed up in advance of the right flank of the 10th Division. At the same date, the III. Turkish Corps opposite Bunar Hissar and the XVII. Corps on its left, supported by parts of the XVIII. Corps, were still exchanging attacks and counter-attacks with the Bulgarian 5th Div. and part of the 3rd about the W. edges of the forest of Sujak. Against the Bulgarian 4th Div. on both sides of Kara Aghach village, was the II. Corps, against the 6th, about Turk Bey, the I., while the Turkish IV. Corps held the line at Lule Burgas and down to the Ergene against the Bulgarian I. Army. Of this army, however, one division only was involved in the frontal fight, and it became evident to the Turks in the afternoon of the 30th that enough enemy forces remained over to roll up their left wing and interpose between the main body and Constantinople. Accordingly, Nazim issued orders for retreat. During Oct. 31 and Nov. I, with various tactical incidents, of which the most important was a successful night-attack of the Bulgarians at Turk Bey, the Turks disengaged themselves, beginning from the left, and by the 2nd the three corps on the right were also in retreat.
The victors were too much exhausted to pursue, and again the Turks vanished. The Bulgarian losses out of perhaps 110,000 combatants numbered 15,000; those of the enemy, whose force was probably rather less, are not known with certainty, but are supposed to have been about 25,000 inclusive of prisoners.
Without further resistance the Turks retired into the famous Chatalja lines, a well-fortified position between Lake Derkos on the Black Sea and Biiyiik Chekmeje lake on the sea of Marmora. However weakened by losses, they could hardly fail to maintain so short and strong a line as this.
On their side, the Bulgarians were tired, far ahead of their supply depots, and losing more and more men daily from sickness. On the other hand, drafts had come up, the 9th Div. replaced before Adrianople by the new 11th joined the III. Army, 2 and the combatant strength of the two armies together was about 140,000. Made optimistic by victory, Savov and his generals determined to storm the Chatalja lines by open force. So confident were they that Savov himself said:" in a week we shall be dining in Constantinople."On Nov. 17, the Bulgarian infantry advanced and drove in the Turkish outposts and on Nov. 18, the assault took place. It was completely repulsed, with heavy losses, and the Bulgarian command, sobered, took care not to waste its reserves in renewed assaults. Armistice proposals were already under discussion, and the battle was broken off in the afternoon of the assault. On Dec. 3, without further fighting on the Chatalja front, a general armistice was signed, more favourable to the Bulgarians perhaps than their military situation warranted, for it gave them the use of the railway through Adrianople without allowing the Turks to revictual that place.
While the main Bulgarian armies were fighting these battles, the 2nd Div. penetrating the difficult Rhodope country had carried out a vigorous offensive in several directions, as the result of which Adrianople was invested on the S.W. side, Demotika and the coast from Xanthi to Dede Aghach occupied, and two Turkish divisions de 2 Which also received the 3rd Div. from the I. Army in exchange for the 6th.
Lule Burgas Of 1912 Successive arrivals Bunar Bul arian divisions Turkish corps etc /Ball MY .Vize;0 2r4;1, <1/4' ` gara Karaagach ?
Saranli I. A MY Low rgas ?a ? e Didzu ? ch S u ?uz ' Mu lim to. olv.
1 C. ?1 Chafo ° ? AV ?: ? ?ce Co.,sranrinop /e o Satikol I stroyed in a series of" drives "which ended in the relics of this force being surrounded and forced to capitulate at Ferejik (Nov. 27).
(C. F. A.) IV. Operations in the Spring of 1913. - The London negotiations of Jan. 1913 were abruptly brought to an end when Enver and the Young Turks, fearing that the Government would, under European pressure, make peace practically at any cost, carried out the coup d'etat of Jan. 23 (in which the Kiamil Government was overthrown and Nazim Pasha murdered), and denounced the armistice. Hostilities began again (with Greece they had never ceased) on Feb. 3 1913. But they entirely lacked the vigour and dramatic interest of the first campaigns. Practically, the story of the second phase is the final instalment of that of the sieges of Yannina, Scutari and Adrianople. An effort was indeed made by the Turkish field forces in Thrace to debouch from the lines of Bulair and those of Chatalja simultaneously with a view to relieving Adrianople, but after locally heavy fighting the Bulgarians succeeded in holding their own on each of these fronts, and thereafter Adrianople was left to its fate.' The fall of Yannina has already been mentioned. The sieges of Scutari and of Adrianople require, however, a rather more detailed account. (C. F. A.) The Scutari Operations. - As has been mentioned already, Montenegro was the first to declare war. The first objective was the old Turkish frontier fortress of Scutari, situated at the point where the Drinasa river flows into Lake Scutari, and consisting only of a castle and a few field-works on the hills surrounding the town. The perimeter measured some 28 m., and the average distance of the works from the town was about two. The works had no deep ditches or sunk wire entanglements.
' Shortly before this the only important naval event of the war had occurred. On Jan. 15, the Turkish cruiser" Hamidieh "had slipped out of the Dardanelles, and from that time till the middle of March she cruised in the waters between Malta, Durazzo and the Levant, raiding commerce as opportunity offered.
Meanwhile, the Turkish battle squadron came out of the Straits on Jan. 17, hoping to find the" Averof "absent from the opposing squadron in chase of the" Hamidieh.'. ' The Greeks, however, had not committed the expected mistake, and after a long-range duel in which the "Averof" inflicted some damage on the Turkish battleships, the latter returned to the Sea of Marmora, where they remained to the end.
At the outbreak of the war. the Turkish garrison was under Hasan Riza Bey, consisted of about 14,000 men (chiefly of the 24th Div.), to which were added, at the last moment, a reserve division from Elbasan under command of Essad, 10,000 strong.
With a force such as this, containing few active elements, only a purely defensive policy was possible. The fortress artillery was weak in numbers and out of date; it consisted (at a generous estimate) of 70 guns (including the divisional field artillery), of which the heaviest were the 12-cm. naval howitzers.
The Montenegrin army stood on Oct. 7, the eve of the declaration of war, as follows: The main body under Crown Prince Danilo (2nd and 3rd Divs., less 9th Bde., 13,000 men and one battalion 12cm. siege artillery), near Podgoritsa (Podgorica). The southern detachment under Gen. Martinovic (1st Div., 8,000 men and three battalions, 12-cm. guns, one battalion 15-cm. howitzers and two battalions 21-cm. howitzers) was near Virpazar and Antivari. The remainder of the army (4th Div. and 9th Bde., 10,000 men, and three mountain batteries) was at Andriyevitsa (Andrijevica), ready to advance into the Sanjak of Novipazar. The operations of this force are described elsewhere.
The advance on Scutari began on the morning of Oct. 9. The wide separation of the two Montenegrin columns offered the Turks a tempting opportunity of manoeuvre on interior lines, but, for the reasons given above, Hasan Riza was obliged to refrain, and the Montenegrin northern group broke through a series of passively defended positions one after the other. They were, however, so disordered by their victory that they were compelled to halt and refit. On the 19th they recommenced their advance, moving very slowly, and on the 25th halted once more on the Kiri on coming under the fire of the artillery of the fortress. Not until the 28th had they completed their bridging operations; the 2nd and 3rd Bdes. then without awaiting the arrival of the main body carried the hill called Great Bardanjolt. A Turkish counter-attack on the 30th threw them back, inflicting such heavy losses that the Montenegrins fell back to Vratsa and undertook no further advance till February. The group, which had evidentl y been clumsily led, took up a position between the Kiri and the Lake of Scutari, some 3,000 yd. in front of the Turkish defences.
The Montenegrin southern group moved on Oct. 9 with its 1st and 3rd 13des. from Antivari to Katrkol, and with the 2nd Bde. from Virpazar along the shore of the lake, both columns meeting with practically no opposition. They then prepared to attack the Turkish advanced position on hill 661. Their siege artillery opened fire only on Oct. 22, and the Turkish forward line was stormed next day with heavy loss. The assailants now found themselves close up against the main defensive line. The northern group having at this time just been driven off the Great Bardanjolt, coordinated attack by both groups was no longer to be thought of. The southern group therefore remained waiting in the position it then occupied.
On Nov. 19 Vukotic, his work in Novipazar completed, arrived with 6,000 men to reinforce the besiegers of Scutari. He himself took over the command of the whole Montenegrin army, his troops being distributed on both fronts.
Soon afterwards the general armistice was concluded; but Hasan refused to recognize it, as the revictualling of the fortress during the armistice had not been agreed to by the Balkan States. However, only minor skirmishes took place in December and January.
The armistice ended on Feb. 3, and shortly afterwards the attack was renewed in earnest against the Turkish strongholds of Muselimi and the Great Bardanjolt, which had been entrenched and fortified in places by blasting in the rocky soil. The assaulting columns were: (a) three battalions (1,500 men) against Muselimi from the N.; (b) five battalions (2,100 men) from the N. by hill 200 against the northern slope of the Great Bardanjolt; six battalions (2,400 men) from the N.E. against its eastern slope, and seven battalions (2,800 [[Chatalja Nov. 17.-18.1912 ' '4. 1 Miles]] Bul arian divisions 1 Turkish /11 ish ? o 9. 9.?
'OS Siege Of Scutari 25.3.13 men) from the S.E. against its southern slope. No reserves were allotted.
The attack was delivered after an artillery bombardment of several hours on Feb. The fortified post of Muselimi fell with little resistance, but on the Great Bardanjolt the attack was shattered at the wire. A second assault on the 8th was no more fortunate. On the 9th however, with the aid of a Montenegrin battery that was got up to very close range, the trenches were carried after fierce handto-hand fighting. The assailants, who had lost 2,000 men, were exhausted.
During the next few days the captured positions were consolidated and field guns brought up. During the main attack the Montenegrins on the N. side had also pushed forward their lines from 3,000 to 1,500 yd. from the Turkish defenses. The lack of siege artillery and of unified fire direction was much felt.
Meanwhile a Serbian contingent under Boyovich had been sent to assist the Montenegrins and complete the investing line between Drinasa and Boyana. Between their right flank and the Montenegrins on the Great Bardanjolt lay a stretch of marshy impassable country. In aid of the attack of Feb. 7 the Serbs delivered a feintattack on the Tarabosh front, which reached the first Turkish line, but was then driven back. A small Montenegrin column also attacked Tarabosh but broke down at the wire.
South-west of Scutari there had been no change since November. The Montenegrins had made good their casualties and lay some 600 to 700 yd. from the Turkish lines, ensconced in carefully-constructed trenches in the rocks. The Turkish positions here extended for some 4 to 5 m. from the strong point of Tarabosh south-eastwards to the Boyana. The besieging artillery (12-cm. guns and 15 and 21cm. howitzers) was concentrated in two groups around Oblika and Boboti, whence it could bring a concentric fire to bear on the lofty commanding peak of the Tarabosh. The counter-bombardment of the defense was weak and practically useless, owing to slow and faulty methods of fire.
The ammunition supplies for the Montenegrins, which were sent up across the lake, were amply sufficient for all needs.
The main attack on the Tarabosh began only on March 31, preceded by five hours' artillery bombardment and by feints on the remainder of the front. During the artillery preparation, the infantry took up their positions of assault - one and a half brigades against the northern and western forces of Tarabosh, and one and a half brigades against the south.
On the latter, the assault was repulsed, completely and with heavy losses. The western attack had been more fortunate. The first Turkish position was broken through in one place, but progress was arrested by flanking machine-gun fire and counterstrokes, and everywhere the Turks held their third position firmly. On April i the attack was repeated but with no better success, and for the next 20 days, until the capitulation, Turks and Montenegrins here lay facing one another half-way up the slope at a distance of 60 to yd. apart - a situation which recalls in many respects the trench warfare days of the World War. The attack had cost the Montenegrins 1,200 dead.
The Turkish position on the Tarabosh consisted of four lines of trenches, some 30 to 40 yd. apart, and each commanding the one in front of it. The third trench line extended into the country to the east, and the fourth to the north. Behind the fourth line a 7.5-cm. quick-firing gun was posted in a shelter on the crest of the hill. In front of the first and third lines were thick belts of wire. The whole position, which was intended for occupation by a battalion, was in fact held by only 500 men.
The Montenegrins, after their unsuccessful attack of March 31 and April 1, confined themselves to the usual bombardment. The siege artillery was reinforced. The Serbian Gen. Boyovic now took command of the besieging army, but there was considerable dissension between him and Vukotic. On April 16, however, the Serbian troops suddenly left Scutari, and the Montenegrins took over the whole line, under violent artillery fire from the Turks, who, however, made no attempt at a sortie against the thin line of the besiegers. And now, when the fortress seemed quite safe from further assault, it suddenly capitulated on April 22. For some time obscure negotiations had been going on between King Nicholas and Essad, and the brave Hasan Riza Pasha, who had refused to surrender despite the shortage of food, had been assassinated. But already Montenegro was under naval blockade by the Great Powers, who had decided that Scutari should belong to the new state of Albania, and on May 6 King Nicholas yielded and withdrew his troops.
(F. C. E.) The Siege of Adrianople. - In the first operations of Oct., already described, Adrianople had come within the ambit of the general battle, and it was not till after the Turks had retreated away towards the Kara Aghach line that operations in front of the fortress assumed the typical siege characters of investment and concentric attack.
The general outline of the defences has been described above. But it is important to add that the permanent forts were old and conspicuous, and, except in a few cases where modernization had been actually begun, possessed only brick vaulting that was not proof against 6-in. shell. The only modern works were a certain number of safety-armament batteries distributed in the intervals, of installations for 5.7 mm. close-defense quick-firing guns under armour, and of concrete shelters and magazines. The general principle of defense adopted was that common to Europe in the period. before the rise of the "group" or "Feste" idea - that is, the forts were infantry redoubts for close defense and the fighting artillery was entirely in the intervals. Unfortunately for the Turks many of the "redoubts" were open at the gorge. The whole system of the main line was well wired in.
Outside the main position, and coinciding with it only on the N.E. front (left bank of the Tunja), was an advanced position, or rather a discontinuous series of field positions on selected sites astride the saddles of ground which separate the rivers (Tunja and lower Maritsa, Maritsa and Arda, Arda and upper Maritsa, upper Maritsa and Tunja). From these advanced positions the Turks had delivered the first sorties above mentioned and to them they had retired under the pressure of the II. Army's and 3rd Div.'s advance astride the Maritsa and Tunja on Oct. 22. In the days following, the 8th, 9th and 3rd Divs. extended the investment, and the 11th Div. and siege artillery were brought up via Mustafa Pasha, as well as some aeroplanes. Presently parts of the 2nd Div. lately operating in the Rhodope came up, some by the Arda and some via Demotika on the S. side. On the other hand, both the 3rd and the 9th Divs. were withdrawn to join the field army in the crisis of Lule Burgas.' After establishing their line generally close up to the Turkish advanced positions (in the course of which, on Oct. 25, Kartal Tepe was captured, and Papas Tepe won and lost again), the Bulgarians sat down to await the Serbians, whose II. Army, set free by the victory of Kumanovo, was being withdrawn from the Vardar to assist their allies. Already on Oct. 27 some Serbian troops had arrived and on Oct. 31 Gen. Stepanovich took over the whole W. front of the investment with Timok I. and part of the Bulgarian i ith Div. from Tunja to upper Maritsa and Danube II. between upper Maritsa and Arda. Gen. Ivanov, commanding his II. Bulgarian Army as well as the whole siege force, had his 8th Div. between Arda and lower Maritsa and the i 1th with part of the 2nd in the broadest sector, the eastern.
At this point the armistice suspended operations, but Shukri Pasha was not authorized by its terms to revictual his garrison and the defenders continued therefore to consume their resources. After hostilities were resumed on Feb. 3 it soon became evident, from attempts at sorties and from increase of desertion, that the garrison was weakening, and it was decided to force home the attack.
Want of transport resources, however, delayed the preparations till the third week in March 1913, when - parts of the 3rd, 9th and 4th Divs. having been brought into the Bulgarian II. Army from Chatalja-90,000 Bulgarian and 30,000 Serbian infantry were actually available for the attack, which would be prepared and covered by the 125 Bulgarian siege guns and howitzers of 12 and 15 cm. calibre (the latter, as mentioned above, being capable of penetrating most of the Turkish vaults) as well as some 250 or more field guns. At this period possibly 50,000 of Shukri's original 60,000 combatants were still available for duty. There were 216 field and 178 heavy guns (including some 21-cm. mortars) distributed in the defenses.
' A Turkish sortie with the intention of preventing this was, as before mentioned, repulsed.
Siege Of Adrianople,1912-13 + The E. front was chosen for attack. The preliminary bombardment was carried out on March 24, and in the night of the 24th25th the whole of the advanced line on the E. front was stormed, on a 6 m. frontage. During the day of the 25th the Bulgarians suffered a good deal in the captured positions, but Gen. Ivanov determined to push home the assault on the main position on the night of the 25th26th, an order which involved an approach march in broad daylight and consequently heavy losses.
The assault was duly delivered in the night, and came to a standstill on the Turkish wire, save at the point where the 10th Bulgarian Regt. of the 8th Div. (brought over from the S. front for the assault) broke into Fort Ayi Yolu, the second work from the N.E. salient of ArnautkSi.
At dawn this regiment found itself isolated but in possession of the fort, and the open gorges of the row of forts tempted the audacious commander to strike out right and left along the ridge. Thus he cleared the way for unit after unit held up at the frontal wire, and, growing snowball fashion, the Bulgarian attack, soon joined by accompanying field batteries, cleared the whole line of the eastern forts by 8 A.M. on the 26th. Meantime the Serbians had captured Papas Tepe, though with considerable losses, and at other parts of the front fierce local attacks were delivered. Shukri's position was hopeless, and he surrendered about midday, with some 60,000 men and all his materiel. This great triumph cost the Bulgarians on the E. front 6,300 killed and wounded, and on the S. side 1,700, or 8,000 in all, while the Serbians lost 1,000 in the Papas Tepe sector and 400 elsewhere - a total loss to the allies of 9,400.
The Turkish war having again been brought to a conclusion by a general armistice, a few days after the fall of Adrianople, peace negotiations were resumed in London, and in these negotiations the settlement of peace as far as Turkey was concerned was, it may be said, the least of many preoccupations. Not only was the Balkan league on the point of internal explosion, but the Concert of Europe was trying to create the new state of Albania in the midst of a three-cornered diplomatic contest between Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia. Further, Rumania was on the point of intervening in order to secure herself against the consequences of Bulgarian aggrandisement, and the internal politics of Turkey became more confused than ever. In these conditions the Peace of London, signed on May 30, lacked every element of reality.
Already Serbia had drawn her western forces into the Ovche Polye area, to dispute possession of the debatable region which Bulgaria claimed, and the II. Army, which had taken part in the siege of Adrianople, was extricated as rapidly as possible lest it be isolated and disarmed in the territory of its allies. The Greeks, who had concentrated the bulk of their forces in roadless Epirus for the siege of Yannina, lost no time in getting them down to the coast and shipping them to Salonika. For their part the Bulgarians used the railway lines Adrianople - Sofia and Dede Aghach - Seres (the latter secured by the conquest of the coastal region by the 7th and 2nd Divs. in the first campaign) to bring most of their forces into Macedonia.
They were deployed along a "line of demarcation" which was a battle-front in all but name. Only one division remained in Adrianople and some militia on the Dobruja frontier.
The origin of the war, as between Bulgaria and Serbia, lay in the non-observance by Bulgaria of the original treaty stipulation that she should aid the Serbian campaign in Macedonia with 100,000 men. Having failed to fulfil her part, she now claimed the territory about Uskub, Kumanovo, and Shtip in virtue of other clauses of that treaty. This claim Serbia was in no mood to concede, all the less so since her advance to the Adriatic had been forbidden b y the Great Powers. As between Bulgaria and Greece, the former's claim to Salonika seems to have had no better basis than a desire to possess it. As already mentioned, the Bulgarian 7th Div., in arriving from the Struma side a few days after the Crown Prince had fought his way into Salonika from the W., had lost no time in publicly claiming ownership, and it was with hardly concealed joy that the Greek Government received and promptly executed a request to transport this division by sea to the Thracian theatre.
On all these matters bargaining might possibly have reached satisfactory solutions, since there was much to justify Bulgaria's claim in Macedonia. But the Bulgarians had skilfully exploited their primacy during the first war to induce the European press and public to regard Serbians and Greeks as mere satellites,' and, as is not unusually the case with successful propaganda, they had come to believe in it themselves, fortified in the belief by fulsome compliments addressing them as the "Prussians of the Balkans" and the "Japanese of the West." On the other hand, the Serbs and the Greeks, thus kept out of the banquet, were not only exasperated, but sober as well. When war came in the last days of June 1913, outpost "incidents" were occurring at many points of the line from Salonika to the old Serbian frontier at Vranya. The combatants were fully deployed, and their battle was the first example of the form that has ' For example, a British officer lecturing at the staff college on his return from Thrace told his hearers that the Bulgarian 7th Div. had remained in the Macedonian theatre to stiffen the Serbs - an extraordinary travesty of the facts.
since become typical of national warfare, the front-to-front conflict along a line which stretches from neutral ground to neutral ground and shows no flank. In this instance it stretched from the Danube to the sea.
The Bulgarian scheme of operations, necessarily offensive, suffered from the weakness of having two objectives - the Ovche Polye and Salonika - and being based on two main lines of communication diverging towards the rear - Kyustendil and Seres - Drama. It also suffered from the political necessity of avoiding the outward semblance of an aggression. The scheme, therefore, was to begin with a succession of outpost affrays along the whole line (which could be represented as a provocation suffered), and then to strike vigorous offensive blows (a) from Seres towards Salonika, (b) from Strumitsa and Radovishta against the Vardar at Krivolak and Gevgeli (Gyevgheli), (the link between the Serbian and Greek armies); and (c) a blow from the region of Kochana towards Egri Palanka. The outpost affrays duly occurred and the real offensives were launched on June 30.
At the opening of the Bregalnitsa battle, the forces were thus disposed :- Bulgarian Army. Commanded by Gen. Radko Dimitriev.2 I. Army (Kutinchev) 9th Div.; one brigade each of 5th, 8th, (Vidin - Berkovitsa and 14th Divs.; 13th Div.
V. Army (Petrov) (Pirot - Vlasina front).
III. Army (Toshev) (Kyustendil).
IV. Army (Korachev) Radovishta front).
VI. Army (Ivanov) (Strumitsa - Seres front).
(The divisions 12 to 15 were new formations, much weaker than the divisions I to 9; the 10th and 11th Divs., created in Oct. 1912, were of intermediate strength.) Serbian Army. Commanded by Putnikas, Chief of General Staff.
II. Army (Stepanovich) Third Ban garrisons of Zayechar and (Danube to Vlasina). Knyashevats. Timok I., Shumaja II.
I. Army (Crown Prince) Danube II., Danube I., Shumaja I. (from the old frontier to Car Vrh, astride the Egri Palanka road).
III. Army (Yankovich) Drina II.
(along the Zletovska Morava II. Morava I., Timok II. and the lower BreMontenegrin contingent, Cavalry divigalnitsa with detachsion.
ments at Krivolak and Gevgeli).
Greek Army. Commanded by Constantine (since March 18, King of the Hellenes).
(Front: Gevgeli Left group 3rd and 10th Divs.
on the Vardar Centre "4th and 5th Divs.
to the Right" 1st, 6th and 7th Divs.
Struma mouth.) Reserve 2nd Div.
(The 10th Div. was an improvised formation.) In addition, to deal with Albanian troubles, each of the allies retained considerable forces in the mountains; including the main body of the Montenegrin army.
Beginning on June 30, the Bulgarian II. Army drove the Greek front back all along the line till it lay S. of Gevgeli - N. of Langaza W. of Struma mouth. The Bulgarian IV. Army broke in between the allies and captured Krivolak with its left, while its right, along with the III. Army, attacked the Serbians along the whole BregalnitsaZletovska line, which was forced. On the Egri Palanka front the Bulgarian IV. Army similarly drove in the Serbian I. Army's outposts.
But the Serbians, and also the Greeks, were disposed in considerable depth, and the Bulgarian soldier had little heart for the offensive once it became evident that the enemy was determined to fight. By the night of July 1 the offensive had died down, and it was the allies' turn to counter-attack. At this moment the Bulgarian-Serbian battle line ran approximately through Krivolak - Dragoyevo - Shtip line of the Bregalnitsa and lower Zletovska - Raychani heights - Gorni Posadnik - Redki Buku - Car Vrh - heights E. of Egri Palanka - heights W. of and parallel to the frontier-headwaters of river Pcinja. At the apex of the Serbian salient the Bulgarians had obtained a firm hold on Car Vrh.
Initiated on July 2, and developed on a large scale on the 3rd, the counter-attack of the Serbian III. Army broke through the Bulgarian line between the Zletovska and Redki Buku inclusive, hustling the defenders back on the 3rd and 4th to the upper Bregalnitsa. Mean 2 Gen. Savo y had resigned, not being in agreement with the war policy of the Government.
1st Div.; main body 5th Div.; main body 14th Div., and one brigade Toth Div.
12th Div., 15th Div., and main body 4th Div.
Volunteer brigade; one brigade 4th Div.; 7th Div., main body 8th Div.; one brigade 3rd Div.; main body 6th Div.; 2nd Div.
Main body 3rd Div.; a volunteer brigade; 11th Div.; one brigade 10th Div., and one brigade 6th Div.
time the Bulgarian forces between Shtip and Krivolak were slowly driving back Timok II. to the Bregalnitsa, but it was now too late for this to influence either the main battle or that of the Greek front.
On the latter, the Bulgarian advance had come to a standstill, as soon as King Constantine had brought up his reserves, and the counter-offensive opened on the 3rd. His left (loth and 3rd Divs.) retook Gevgeli, his centre (4th, 2nd, 5th) Kilkish, and his right (1st, .6th, 7th) drove back the Bulgarian left on Nigrita and also eastward on the Seres road (July 3-4). On July 7 the Greek right reached the Salonika-Drama railway, and their left from Gevgeli carried the pass over the Belashitsa which leads to Strumitsa. Thus Ivanov was cut off from the railwa y, and his only line of retreat lay up the narrow Struma valley to Jumaya.
Yielding to necessity, the Bulgarian forces on the Vardar withdrew, ere it was too late, into the Belashitsa valley, while those pursuing Timok II. on the lower Bregalnitsa halted and drew back.
The opportunity which thus presented itself to the Serbian III. Army of interposing between Ivanov and Bulgaria led to a regrouping of the Serbian forces for the benefit of this army, which, pursuing its advantage, drove back its opponents towards the line of mountains in the upper Bregalnitsa bend (Obozna-1340-Grlena).
But the Bulgarians, in order to relieve pressure and to keep their hold upon Western opinion, seized the initiative again while the regrouping was in process and the Greeks had hardly yet entered the Struma and Strumitsa valleys.
Their new offensive was twofold - local attacks by the I. and V. Armies on all the routes leading into Old Serbia, and heavy counterattacks on the front of the Serbian I. Army. The first, made with columns of varying strengths on the routes leading to Zajechar, Kynashevats, Pirot and Vlasina, was repulsed by the Serbian II. Army after some initial successes, and was over by July io. The second was more serious, and it seems that the process of building up the strength of the Serbian III. Army opposite Kochana was not only suspended but actually reversed to cope with a crisis. Finally, however, the Bulgarians were repulsed here also, and retired to the line of frontier mountains (Golemi Vrh-Bozderitsa-Rujan-Sivakobila), more or less in touch with the right of the forces in the mountains of the Bregalnitsa bend.
By this time the Greeks were in possession of the Strumitsa basin and had made some progress up the Struma. But Ivanov had obtained an opportunity that he could not have gained by his own efforts to extricate the various forces of the Bulgarian left which were scattered from the Vardar to the Struma.
The new allied offensive, therefore, begun all along the Serbian line on the 15th, and starting on the battle-front above mentioned (Golemi Vrh-Sivakobila-Obochna), resolved itself into a series of local combats with the object of cutting off as much as possible of Ivanov's rearguard detachments and of making strategic connexion with the Greek left at Pehchevo. At this stage, indeed, bolder strategy was hardly required, for already Rumania had declared war on Bulgaria and had begun an unopposed march on Sofia, while the Turks at Chatalja and Bulair, ignoring the Treaty of London, reoccupied Adrianople without firing a shot.
Yet this relative inactivity of the Serbs gave the Bulgarians one more opportunity, which they seized. Using a manoeuvre which was destined to become a familiar practice of strategy in the World War, but, at that date and in that country of mountains and primitive communications, was conspicuously daring and novel, they transferred Kutinchev's I. Army from the old Serbian frontier (Vidin-Pirot front) to Ivanov's theatre, placing the newcomers on the outer flank of the advancing Greeks. On July 25 Ivanov and Kutinchev simultaneously attacked the leading troops of the Greek central or Struma column 1 before the main body was clear of the Kresna defile. But the capacity of resistance of the Greek troops, especially in mountain country for which their aptitude was remarkable throughout these campaigns, enabled them to weather the first crisis; they were reinforced from the left as well as from the rear, and on the night of the 26th-27th the Bulgarians withdrew towards the Jumaya Pass.
The venture was at an end. Surrounded by hostile columns converging on Sofia from every quarter, Bulgaria yielded on July 31, and on Aug. Jo was signed the Peace of Bucharest.
Bibliography. - The outbreak of the World War in 1914 prevented all the combatants of the Balkan wars from producing official histories, and the only sources available are books and papers published immediately after the operations. Concise military accounts of the first war in all theatres are Boucabeille's Guerre Turco balkanique and Immanuel's Balkankrieg. For the Macedonian campaign and Scutari, by far the best authority is the French general staff publication Revue mil. des armees etrangkres (monthly numbers Feb.-July 1914). For the campaign of 1912 in Thrace, A. de Pennenrun's Campaine de Thrace is the best contemporary account; an interesting study by Maj. (afterwards Brig.-Gen.) P. Howell, The Campaign in Thrace (1913), stops short before Chatalja. In 1915 Gen. Palat produced a volume, Guerre des Balkans, which assembles most of the known evidence for the Thracian campaign. For the second war of 1913 very little of military value has been published.
A summary of dispositions, movements, and events will be found in Hazell's Annual, 1914, pp. 369-71. For the Serbian part in both wars A. Kutschbach's Die Serben im Balkankrieg is useful as containing official information. (C. F. A.)
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