"DUNAJEC -SAN, BATTLES OF THE. - The line of the river Dunajec and that of the San, both in West Galicia, marked the two successive stages in the break-through battle which initiated the Austro-German offensive of 1915 on the eastern front.
After the severe fighting on the Carpathian front (see Carpa Thians, Battles Of The) there ensued a pause in the second half of April 1915, both on the side of the Central Powers and on that of the Russians, whose attempts at a break-through had failed. Fighting continued only in the sector of the German Southern Army up to the end of the month, the crowning day being April 24, when Hofmann's Austro-Hungarian corps stormed the Ostry heights.
The general situation on the eastern front was at this time somewhat unsatisfactory. The Austro-Hungarian armies in the Carpathians were exhausted; the IV. and I. Armies, Woyrsch's Army, and the German forces on the eastern front were certainly holding their ground, but were continually being weakened by having to detach troops to the Carpathian front. The Russians were in similar case; the combats in the mountains had absorbed not only great masses of men but also quantities of material, which could not so readily be replaced. Thus, although the danger in the Carpathians was not yet over, Russian offensive movements on a large scale were hardly to be expected.
The position was far more favourable on the German western front, where the Germans awaited the French attacks with calm confidence, while behind the lines the organization of 14 new divisions was nearing completion. The opportunity for improving the situation in the E. appeared, therefore, to have arrived. The desirability of relieving the pressure on the Carpathian front seemed self-evident, and the only question was as to the direction and method of execution of the offensive. The choice appeared to lie between an offensive on a large scale against the whole Russian front, combined with enveloping movements against its northern and southern flanks, and a direct breakthrough at some part of the line. For the latter operation the area Gorlice-Tarnow appeared to offer advantages; it had been largely denuded of troops by the Russians during the course of their Carpathian offensive, and a drive on Sanok, via the Jaszlo and Krosno basins, would get into the rear of the Russian forces in the Carpathians and roll them up. The length of time that would be necessary for the preparation of an attacking group in the Carpathians, where the railway communications were very bad, would be bound to militate against the success of the first plan, while an enveloping movement in the N. would be too far distant to have any lasting influence in improving the situation in the Carpathians. West Galicia, on the other hand, was well suited as an area of assembly for an offensive group, and the possibilities of success were highly promising.
The High Commands of both the Central Powers had early in April decided, independently of each other, for the second solution of the problem; indeed, the Austrians had, in the middle of March, undertaken an offensive towards Gorlice with weak forces, which resulted only in a tactical success. When the Austrians early in April renewed their request for German divisions to be dispatched to the Carpathians the whole matter came up for discussion; the preliminary conditions for the offensive were arranged by telegraph, and the final decision was arrived at on April 14, at a conference between the two chiefs of the general staffs in Berlin.
The XI. Army, under Gen. von Mackensen, was organized as a shock group, consisting of eight German divisions from the western front, the two divisions of the Austrian VI. Corps, and the filth Honved Ca y. Div.; and it assembled behind the right wing of the Austrian IV. Army. This latter was also placed under Mackensen, who was himself subordinated to the Austrian High Command. These two armies were to carry out the main attack in West Galicia, while the armies of Dankl N. of the Vistula and those of Boroevic, Bohm, Linsingen and Pflanzer were to display all possible activity and engage the enemy in their front so as to prevent him from detaching troops to the main attack. Simultaneously two demonstrations in the Prasznysz and Novgorod areas, and a raid on Memel, were planned.
After the completion of the assembly of the XI. Army, the distribution of the' Austro-German forces in West Galicia and the Carpathians was as follows: In West Galicia, on the Lower Dunajec, the heights of Wal, and the Biala as far as Cigzkowice, was the Austrian IV. Army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand (7 inf. divs.). To the right of this, the XI. German Army, under Gen. von Mackensen (10 inf. and 1 ca y. divs.), lay by Luzna and Gorlice as far as Malastow. The Austrian III. Army, under Gen. von Boroevic (14 inf. and 2 ca y. divs.), stretched from Malastow in a salient curve S. of the Carpathian crest by Zboro to Virava. Thence the Austrian II. Army, under Gen. von Bohm-Ermolli (14 inf. divs.), held its position as far as the heights W. of the Uzsok pass. From here by Zawadka, on both sides of the Orawa and the Oportales, by the Wyszokow saddle to the sources of the Moloda, lay the Southern German Army, under Gen. von Linsingen (91 inf. divs.). Next came the Austrian VII. Army, under Gen. Baron von Pflanzer-Baltin (82 inf. and 5 ca y. divs.), curving on the line Solotwina, Ottynia, Horodenka Zaleszczki, and along the Dniester and the frontier.
On the Russian side there stood in the area S. of the Vistula, and on the Carpathian front, the III. Army (Gen. Radko Dimitriev), the VIII. Army (Gen. Brussilov), the Stry detachment and the IX. Army (Gen. Lechitski) - in all some 40 inf. and 16 ca y. divs. with at least io Militia Opolchevie brigades.
By the end of April all the preparatory measures for the offensive were complete, and on May fi the preliminary bombardment on the front of Mackensen's Army Group began; this was followed at 6 A.M. on the 2nd by four hours intensive fire by some 1,500 guns of all calibres, on a scale far surpassing anything yet known. The Russian trenches, on which many months' labour had been expended, and which were sited with great skill, were soon so shattered that the infantry, who had advanced to assaulting distance, were able to storm them.
During the night of the 2nd the left-wing group of the IV. Army, the combined division under Field-Marshal-Lt. Steger-Steiner, forced the line of the Lower Dunajec by a surprise attack, and during the day established itself at Otfinow on the eastern bank.
The vigorous offensive of the XI. Army, in which the Austrian VI. Corps specially distinguished itself, met with little resistance from the Russians, who had been completely overwhelmed by the bombardment. Between Cigzkowice and the heights S. of Gorlice their lines were completely broken through. The Austrian X. Corps, fighting on the left wing of the III. Army, had a large share in this success. By 5 P.M. it had stormed the Russian positions on the heights S.E. of Ropica Ruska, and E. of Malastow, and continued its advance up till a late hour of the night.
The Austro-Hungarian IV. Arm y, which had to carry the very strong and defensible ridges of Dobrotyn and hills 419 and 402, was also in the end successful, after severe fighting, assisted in some measure by the effect of the XI. Army's break-through. Meanwhile the remaining Austro-German armies kept the Russians on their respective fronts constantly on the alert, and thus prevented any transference of troops; the Russian III. Army alone succeeded in concentrating strong reserves (III. Caucasian Corps and 63rd Res. Div.) in the vicinity of Jaszlo.
The offensive was continued on the 3rd with the utmost energy; the XIV. Corps stormed hills 419 and 402, while the IX. Corps on the right wing of the army captured the heights E. of Gromnik. Up to mid-day the XI. Army met with little resistance; in the afternoon, however, it came up against a series of strong positions, which were not captured till the evening, and its right wing reached Wapienne, the centre Biecz, while the left wing occupied the Lipie heights and the ridge N.E. of Olpiny. The left corps of the III. Army stormed Ostra Gora, the Russians in front of it establishing themselves on the E. edge of Magura.
By the 4th such rapid progress had been made that it was possible to extend the attack on the whole front of the III. Army.
The Army High Command ordered the XI. Army to continue its advance, with its reenforced southern wing moving in the direction of Dukla-Krosno-Strzyzow, the III. Army's left moving on Tylawa, its centre and right continuing to hold fast the enemy in their front. The time for the assumption of the offensive was to be at the discretion of the army commander himself. The neighbouring army under Bohm was already assigned as a reonforcement of the left wing, to operate in harmony with Boroevic's right wing.
The left wing of the IV. Army was heavily attacked on the night of the 4th-5th, and little progress was made by it or by the German 47th Res. Div. in the course of the following day. On the other hand, the Russians opposed to the XIV. Corps, in the centre of the IV. Army, fell back before dawn; both divisions of the corps followed them up closely, and by nightfall had reached the line of the Biala. The right corps captured the heights N.E. of Tuchow and Dobrotyn hill. The XI. Army made very rapid progress on this day, driving the enemy back step by step as far as the Wisloka, and establishing itself at Pilgrzymka Osobnica and Olpiny in close touch with the IV. Army.
On the left wing of the III. Army the 21st Landwehr Inf. Div. occupied the heights of Watkowa after heavy fighting.
On the 5th, however, the resistance of the Russian III. Army was still unbroken. The IX. Corps, indeed, captured the heights of Obzar and Wiszowa, thus securing possession of the whole of the Dobrotyn ridge, while Szende's brigade and the 106th Inf. Div., in the face of stubborn resistance, cleared all the area E. of Tuchow as far as Zalasowa and the heights of Trzemesna W. of it, while the 3rd Div. succeeded in crossing the Biala; but the 8th Div., which finally followed the 3rd over the river, and the whole of the northern wing of the IV. Army, were unable to gain any success.
On the right wing of the XI. Army, however, Gen. von Emmich's corps, which had pressed far forward, again met with great success, throwing the Russians back behind the Jasiolka in the direction of Dukla, while the left wing of the army advanced to Jodlowa.
This rapid advance naturally facilitated the task of Boroevic's army. As early as the morning of the 5th the front of the XXIV. and XII. Russian Corps, before the centre and left of that army, began to yield. Pursued by the Austro-Hungarian X., XVII. and VII. Corps in the direction of Jasliska and the upper valley of the Laborcza, they were driven into the area W. of Tylawa behind the valley of the Ondava and onto the heights N.E. of Nagybakocy. Only the XXI. Russian Corps held its ground at great cost against the German Beskiden Corps, fighting on Boroevic's right wing.
On the N. wing of the IV. Army the enemy's resistance was at length broken on the night of the 6th by the repeated assaults of Stoger-Steiner's Div. and the German 47th Res. Div. While the Russians evacuated their positions below Tarnow as far as the Vistula, the Austro-German troops occupied Tarnow and initiated a pursuit in the area W. of Pilzno.
The right wing of the IV. and the left and centre of the XI. Army had meanwhile reached the Wisloka. Emmich penetrated as far as Wietrzno with his corps, and in the Dukla area blocked all the lines of retreat leading N. and N.E., along which Radko Dimitriev's defeated columns were now retiring in wild disorder. At Tylawa the Austro-Hungarian X. Corps, advancing from the W., encountered the 48th Inf. Div. of the Russian XXIV. Corps under Gen. Kornilov, and, in conjunction with Field-Marshal-Lt. Berndt's Cavalry Div., forced the greater part of it to surrender and scattered the rest, who were captured some days later by Emmich's troops.
By the evening the Austrian XVII. and VII. Corps had reached the Dukla pass and the Laborcza valley, driving before them Radko Dimitriev's broken right wing, which took refuge behind the Jasiolka and the Carpathian ride, leaving behind many prisoners and vast quantities of war material.
In view of these successes, it was to be expected that the Russian XXI. Corps would shortly be compelled to evacuate the Lupkow pass which would shake the whole Russian front along the Carpathians to the E. of it. The rolling-up of this line seemed to ensure the complete strategic success of the five days' " breakthrough " battle of Gorlice-Tarnow in which Radko Dimitriev's army had been driven back more than 20 m. on a front of loo m., with a loss of 50,000 prisoners, 50 guns and much other material.
The Pursuit and Battles at Sanok and Rzeszow (Ma y 6-zz). - After his severe defeat, Radko Dimitriev's plan was to hold the Lupkow pass with his left wing, and, supported upon this, to bring the pursuit to a stand on the line Nowotaniec-Besko-right bank of the Wislok, where there were positions favoured by the lay of the ground, and then, between the Vistula and the Wislok, on the line Wielopole-Zassow-Malec. Here he proposed to reconstitute his units, which had fallen into great disorder, and to strengthen them by bringing up reserves. Troops were sent to him from other fronts, and by the 8th he could again dispose of 18 inf. divs., 5 ca y. divs. and 5 Reichswehr bdes. The orders were that the offensive was to be continued with all possible vigour. Mackensen's arm y was to push forward over the stretch of the Wislok between Besko and Frysztak on Mrzyglod and Tyczin, and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand on Rzeszow, while Boroevic was to roll up Brussilov's VIII. Russian Army in the direction of Sanok. Bohm's II. Austrian Army was to join up corps by corps from the left wing in proportion to the progress of the attack.
In the course of the 8th the Russian positions were once more attacked along the whole front, and in the sector of Mackensen's army were stormed along the whole E. bank of the Wislok. Both here and in the front of the centre and right of the IV. Army the fighting was heavy; the Russians were driven by the latter from Pilzno and Brzostek and pursued beyond Debica and the hill of Chelm. In front of the newly formed group under Gen. von Kirchbach, composed of Stoger-Steiner's Div., the German 47th Res. Div. and certain Landsturm formations, on the left wing of the IV. Army, the Russian IX. Corps fell back in the afternoon to the new line prescribed.
Meanwhile, Boroevic had also pressed the Russians hard and by 3 A.M. forced them to abandon the Lupkow pass as well as the strong Bokuwica ridge, and to retire to the line Zarszyn-BukowskoSzczawne, where they once more took up strong positions. As a natural result of the retreat of the III. Russian Army, the whole of Brussilov's VIII. Army began to give ground, and Bohm's army, with the W. wing of Linsingen's, at once took up the pursuit.
On the 9th, however, violent resistance was once more encountered, particularly on the fronts of the German Southern Army and the Austro-Hungarian II. and III. Armies, from the Ostry hill to Besko. The Russian point d'appui at the latter place was much endangered by the withdrawal of the Russian front fighting against Mackensen to the left bank of the Stobnica; but it was urgently necessary to hold it, as also the strong front Bukowsko-Szczawne, in order to secure Brussilov's undisturbed retreat. Despite a violent counter-attack delivered by three newly arrived divisions astride the Sanok road between Besko and the left flank of the Russian line on the Stobnica, the Russians were forced to abandon Besko on the evening of the 9th.
When on the 10th Bohm's left wing, pressing forward by Baligrod and the San, captured Szczawne, and the gallant X. Corps on Boroevic's left took Zarszyn, the strong position of Bukowsko became untenable; and by the evening of the 11th the Russians had fallen back behind the San. The III. Army followed them up to the area Sanok-Zagorcz. Meanwhile the XI. Army had stormed the Stobnica position and advanced its front. Of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's army Kirchbach's corps on the evening of the 11th reached the Lower Wislok while the centre took Sedziszow. During the night of the 12th the IX. Corps secured Rzeszow.
The Russians, after some minor rear-guard actions, had also fallen back along the whole front before the II. Army, so that on the 11th the Austrian left wing had reached the Lisko area, while the right had passed the Upper San, where the Southern Army was.
At this point may be said to have ended the battle of RzeszowSanok, the effects of which were quickly seen in the retirement of the enemy line N. of the Vistula. The Russians now prepared to make a fresh stand on the strong defensive line of the San below Przemysl, where they had constructed strong lines of defences, with their flanks resting on the Dniester marshes at Wielki Bloto, and the angle made by the Vistula and the San. Up to this point they had lost 130,000 prisoners, 100 guns and 300 machine-guns.
The Russians, foreseeing the possibility of a further retreat, had chosen as their next position the line of the San below the fortress of Przemysl, which had again been placed in a state of defence, as far as Nisko, and they had strengthened this line by the construction of bridgeheads at Radymno and Jaroslaw. Below Nisko the line enclosed the angle formed by the Vistula and the San, whence a particularly strong line of defence led to Tarnobrzeg and was continued on the far side of the Vistula to Klimontow and Opatow. The southern front was connected by an equally strong fortified line through Husakow and Krukienice with the Dniester, which served as the next natural line of defence for the Russians. At first, however, they did not make full use of this river as an obstacle, since they advanced their IX. Army against Pflanzer-Baltin to the Pruth.
The immediate object of the Austrian and German High Commands was to force the San below Przemysl, and to attack that fortress. The following objectives were assigned to the armies. The IV. Army was to force the Lower San, and the XI. to pass that river on either side of Jaroslaw. The N. wing of the III. Arm y was to push forward S. of the San against the W. and S. fronts of Przemysl, and secure that place by a coup de main, while its S. wing advanced by Dobromil on Mosciska. To the II. Army was assigned the direction Chyrow-Sambor, while the Southern Army's objectives were Drohobycz and Stryj. The VII. Army was to maintain its positions, while on the N. of the Vistula the armies of Dankl and Woyrsch were to follow up the enemy, with their inner flanks moving by Daleszyce on Slupia.
After breaking off the battle the Russians had rapidly fallen back to the San, and were as rapidly pursued. The pursuers encountered in the main only a few small rear-guards during the next few days; the II. Army, however, had violent fighting at the San crossings; and on the III. Army front, the 27th Div., in conjunction with the German Beskiden Corps, dispersed a hostile rear-guard on the heights of Magiera, S. of Przemysl.
On the 14th the German Guard Corps found itself face to face with the strong fortifications of the bridge-head at Jaroslaw. After a short but intense preliminary bombardment the Guard infantry, assisted by those of Field-Marshal Arz's Corps advancing from the S.W., stormed the works on the 15th, and on the 16th entered Jaroslaw and crossed to the E. bank of the San.
The IV. Army reached the Russian lines on the Vistula-San angle on the same date, and took up a position on the W. bank of the San as far as the Wislok. S. of the Wislok the XI. Army had established itself on the left bank of the San, in face of the fortress girdle of Przemysl and extending to the San S. of Mackowice; the III. Army aligned itself as far as Husakow before the S.W. and S. fronts of Przemysl, while the II. Army had worked its way forward to the entrenched line extending over Krukienice to the Wielki Bloto.
S. of this marshy area the Southern Army had driven Cherbachev's XI. Russian Army back on Stryj and Dolina, which had been formed out of the Stryj detachment early in May. Pflanzer's Army was compelled to withdraw before the Russian IX. Army (Lechitski) to the Pruth between Czernowitz and Kolomea, and there made preparations to hold this line, while cooperating with its reenforced left wing in the offensive of the Southern Army.
N. of the Vistula the Russian IV. Army was forced back by the armies of Dankl and Woyrsch to the line Nowe Miasto-MniszekIlza-Opatow-Klimontow, after heavy fighting in the Czarna and Lysa Gora areas, and small rear-guard actions elsewhere. Before the IX. German Army the Russians held their ground.
In 14 days of fierce battle the Central Powers had gained a great victory, and had pushed back the Russian " steam-roller " some 110 m. eastwards, besides securing 170,000 prisoners, 128 guns, 368 machine-guns and immense quantities of war material.
A pause in the operations now ensued, which was devoted to the preparations for a further offensive, to comprise the forcing of the San line, the capture of the fortress of Przemysl, and the storming ,of the heights S.E. of the fortress.
The San itself at this season was not a serious obstacle, and its passage presented no difficulties in itself; but on the far bank there existed strong and well-prepared positions, while the Russians had received considerable reenforcements; their front E. of the Vistula having been strengthened by some 9 divs. at the beginning of May. The fortress of Przemysl had been reconstructed by the Russians and was now too strong to capture by a coup de main. The bringingup of heavy artillery would therefore be necessary, and the strong positions S.E. of the Vistula also demanded a carefully planned attack. It appeared, moreover, that the Russians had recovered their breath in this new position, and that they intended to oppose an energetic resistance to the pursuit. Fresh and thorough preparations had, therefore, to be made for the continuance of the attack. The transport of supplies could not keep pace with the troops during their rapid advance, for the Russians in their retreat had carried out a thorough work of destruction. The roads and railways could not be used, and the bridges had been blown up. Only after hasty restoration had been carried out could the necessary heavy artillery and ammunition be sent forward.
As the front became shortened during the advance, the Austrian VIII. Corps was on May io taken out of the line on the III. Army front, transferred by rail to the IV. Army, and attached to Kirchbach's group where it was to be assigned the part of storming Sandomierz. The 41st Honved Inf. Div. was also transferred from the III. to the I. Army, coming into line on the 19th at Staszow.
The imminent entry of Italy into the war had no influence on the continuance of the offensive, apart from the fact that the VII. Corps (17th Inf. Div. and 10th Honved Inf. Div.) were entrained on the 21st at MezO Laborcz for the S.W. front. There was, however, a spontaneous pause during which both sides made their preparations for the forthcoming great battle. The Austro-German troops were engaged on their front in securing favourable conditions for their impending attack, while the Russians endeavoured, in a series of powerful counter-blows, to check the progress of their pursuers and even to prepare the ground for a possible offensive.
The occupation of Jaroslaw early on the 16th, and the construction within the next few days of a regularly fortified bridge-head, in which was included the village of Sieniawa, captured on the 18th by the Austro-Hungarian 10th Inf. Div., afforded a favourable sallyport for the next advance. Despite the gallant counter-attacks of the III. Caucasian and XXIV. Corps, the German X. and Guard Corps and Arz's Austrian Corps were able to consolidate their positions in this sector. The 12th Div. of the last-named corps on the 10th carried out a successful advance towards Radymno. The XI. Army Command, in order to assist the II. and III. Armies, which were making little headway, projected an attack on the 24th with the left flank along the Szklo on the E. bank of the San. If the part played by the Russians opposed to the XI. Army was mainly passive, they showed a more aggressive spirit opposite the IV. Army on the Lower San. Units of their IX. Corps near Misko, and of their X. Corps near Stare Miasto, delivered violent attacks on the 18th, which were defeated. On the 19th. after being reenforced. they again crossed the San between Rudnik and Stare Miasto but had to return hurriedly to the E. bank as the result of a counter-attack by the 3rd Inf. Div. Heavy fighting also occurred near Rudnik, where the 8th Inf s. Div. defeated with the utmost gallantry the repeated Russian efforts to effect a break-through.
During the pause in the fighting here, violent fighting took place in the bend of the Vistula on the front of Dankl's and Woyrsch's armies. The pursuit, which had been begun on the 12th by the former army, had been successively taken up by Woyrsch's armies and by KOvess's army group. The right wing of Dankl's army encountered strong resistance on the 16th on the line KoprziwnycaKlimontow, advanced to the attack but failed to break through; the same fate befell the II. Corps on his left wing, which had to relinquish its initial gains in face of a violent Russian counterattack. Woyrsch's right wing, which was in touch, was also held up; on his left wing, however, the 16th Inf. Div. took Ruski Brod near the source of the Radomka and drove the enemy back in flight.
During the 17th indications of a Russian counter-offensive between the inner wings of Dankl's and Woyrsch's armies increased in number, and Bredow's div. (Woyrsch's right wing) and the II. Corps actually had to resist a series of violent assaults which, in the case of Dankl's army, even suggested the necessity of a retreat: behind the Czarna. On the 18th, however, the expected counteroffensive failed to materialize against Dankl's left wing; the Russians devoted all their efforts on this and the following day to the capture of Bredow's positions, and they also exercised considerable pressure against Dankl's southern wing; all their attacks, however, were beaten off.
On the 10th the main body of the Austro-Hungarian 7th Cay. Div. came into action on Bredow's right, and the 41st Honved Inf. Div. from the III. Army, on the II. Corps' left; and the Russians in this part of the front thereupon fell back before this corps and Bredow's div. to an entrenched position on the line Brody (on the Kamienna)-Wasniow-Kobylany. The pursuers worked forward to this on the 24th. Nothing of moment occurred in the centre and on the northern wing of Woyrsch's army, or on the fronts of KOvess's army group and the German IX. Army.
The Russian attempt to break through in the mountain area N. of Kielce, to relieve the pressure on their retiring troops N. of the Vistula, had thus failed; 6,300 prisoners had been lost.
S. of the Vistula there now began the violent struggle prepared for since the 12th, which in the battle of Przemysl, was to introduce the second phase of the great spring campaign in Galicia.
The Battle of Przemysl (May 24-June 6). - On May 24 the attack by Mackensen's army, which had been planned four days earlier, began along the Sklo in an E. and S.E. direction. At the same time the II. and III. Armies were to advance in a N.E. direction along the Mosciska-Przemysl road, with the object of driving the Russian field army away from the fortress from the S. The IV. Army, securing the San crossing at Sieniawa, was to direct its main effort against the strong Russian positions in the angle between the San and the Vistula about Rudnik and Machow, while the Southern Army was to continue its attacks in the Drohobycz-Stryj area. As early as the 24th the XI. Army forced back the enemy along all the front of attack. The German XLI. and Austro-Hungarian Corps, on this and the following days, accomplished the brilliant feat of storming Radymno, which the Russians had erected into a powerful bridgehead by means of three exceptionally strong lines connected with the northern defences of Przemysl.
A violent and extremely effective artillery preparation begun early in the morning made it possible to take Ostrow and Radymno on the 25th, and finally for the VI. Corps to capture the bridge-head of Zagrody. The Russians fled over the San in complete disorder. By the premature destruction of the bridge over the river, 21,000 of them were cut off, and fell into the hands of the victors, who also captured 39 guns and 40 machine-guns.
By the evening of the 25th Mackensen's attacking wedge had been driven forward on the E. bank of the San to the line Radwa-Zapalow (on the Lubaczowka)-Laski-Lazy. On the W. bank the Bavarian 11th and German 119th Divs. had already on the 24th reached the heights S.W. of Zablotce. On the 26th the XLI. Corps succeeded in gaining possession of the S. end of Swiete on the W. hank of the San, while the VI. Corps took the villages of Nienowice and Chotyniec. The Guard established itself on the line Zaleska Wola-Zapalow.
The Russians had made every effort to check Mackensen's advance, particularly by means of violent counter-attacks at night, but in vain. Mackensen's advance had progressed so far to the E. that Przemysl was now encircled from the north. He proceeded to consolidate his positions in this area, partly in order to counter a Russian offensive which was just beginning, partly in order to await the moment when the II. and III. Armies should be able to deliver a direct assault on Przemysl from the south.
The right wing of the II. Army and the whole of the III. continued their attacks on the 24th with the utmost energy. On the previous night a Russian counter-attack had pressed the XVIII. Corps back a little, but on the morning of the 25th the position was restored, largely owing to the arrival of the 13th Landwehr Inf. Div.
Field-Marshal-Lt. Schmidt's group (7th Inf. Div. of the IV. Corps and the XVIII. Corps). attacking on the left wing against Mosciska, gained some small successes, but the German Beskiclen Corps farther to the left made no advance on this day. On the 26th it was able to storm two hills near Husakow. but as against this all the efforts of Schmidt's group broke down before the strong Russian positions, which were in part concreted and consisted in places of seven successive lines of trenches. Owing to the lack of heavy artillery the attack here could progress only by systematic sapping, and in this manner it had, by the 28th, worked its way up to the Russian wire entanglements.
Meanwhile the Russians had resolved on a counter-offensive with superior forces against the S. wing of the IV. Army. Their plan was to advance from the N. and N.E. over the San at Sieniawa and to the N.W. of it, and thus to put a term to Mackensen's progress.
On the 27th the strongly reinforced III. Caucasian Corps (Gen. Irmanov) delivered a surprise attack upon the Sieniawa bridge-head. The Austro-Hungarian 10th Div., consisting in part of untrustworthy Czech troops, gave way, and was thrown back to the W. bank of the San and the Lower Lubaczowka, losing 9,000 prisoners, 9 guns and 4 machine-guns. Strong reinforcements hurried forward from other divisions succeeded in stiffening the badly weakened right wing of the army on the W. bank of the San, and in averting the menace to Mackensen's left flank. On his front also the Russians on the 27th delivered unexpected but unsuccessful attacks against the Lubaczowka and the positions of the VI. and XLI. Corps at Chotyniec and Starzawa.
On the 28th the Russians renewed their attacks in this area and on the San. On the Lubaczowka they succeeded in penetrating the lines held by the German X. Corps, but were driven out by a flanking movement. On the next day they again delivered strong assaults in the Sieniawa area and made vain attempts to pass the San.
The N. wing of the IV. Army, in conjunction with the I. Army on its left (now under Kirchbach, in place of Dankl, who had been appointed to the command in Tirol), moved forward on the 24th to attack the fortified line Machow - Rudnik, and by the 26th had forced the Russians back to the S. of Grebow. The Russian attack at Sieniawa, however, necessitated the immediate withdrawal of forces to strengthen the right wing of the IV. Army and the cessation of the N. wing's offensive. On the 30th, therefore, there was a temporary cessation of activity; at the same time indications were observed of a renewed Russian blow against the inner flanks of the IV. and XI. Armies. The Supreme Army Command gave expression to this fear in instructions to these armies to devote special care to the strengthening of their positions and to hold reserves in readiness on their threatened wings. The III. and II. Armies were meantime to pursue their attacks.
During the following days, from May 30 to June 3, Przemysl was stormed (see Przemysl). Throughout this period hard fighting was also taking place immediately S.E. of the fortress and on the San between Przemysl and Rudnik. In the latter area it was the Russians who took the initiative. Since the capture of the Sieniawa bridge-head by the III. Caucasian Corps, it became clear that strong forces were being concentrated against the XI. Army, and that the Russian IX. Corps in the Ulanow - Rudnik area was being reinforced. The XIV. and XV. Corps of the Russian IV. Army had been brought over the Vistula to the area Sandomierz - Nisko.
In front of the Austro-Hungarian IV. Army and the northern wing of the German XI. Army (in all, i 12 inf. and 2 ca y. divs.) stood the whole of the Russian III. Army (some 20 inf. and 4 cay. divs., with 6 militia brigades). The Russians appeared to be planning an energetic counter-attack; on June 2 the Austro-Hungarian IX. and XIV. Corps had had to repulse heavy attacks and to prevent attempts to cross the San.
On the evening of June 1 the 8th Inf. Div. on the left wing of the XIV. Corps W. of Rudnik had been hard pressed and forced to fall back to its next line of defence; all attacks on the 2nd were beaten off, but there was danger of a Russian break-through just W. of Rudnik, as the whole XIV. Corps in conjunction with the IX. Corps had been pressed back to the line running from the heights W. of Tarnagora, by Jezowa to Jata, where it came into touch with the right wing of the VIII. Corps which was bent back on the line Stany - Przyszow. In the case of this latter corps nothing worth mentioning occurred. All attacks on the Lubaczowka were repulsed by the German X. and Guard Corps, on the northern wing of Mackensen's army.
On the following day the IV. Army front continued quiet, the troops fortifying their new defensive line, which was not attacked. The fall of Przemysl having freed troops of the III. Army for use elsewhere, the Austrian X. Corps (24th and 25th Divs.) was hastily dispatched to Lancut and Rzeszow, to reinforce the IV. Army. Troops were also dispatched to the XI. Army, the German 22nd Div. to Lancut, the 8th Bavarian Div. to Radymno, the German XXVI. Corps to Jaroslaw, and the 107th Div. to Przeworsk.
On the 4th the Russians renewed their massed attacks against the IV. Army, but these were all repelled with heavy loss. The 59th Regt. near Tarnagora repulsed an attack by the four regiments of the Russian 61st Inf. Div. The northern wing of the XI. Army also dealt successfully with a series of Russian attacks delivered as late as the night of the 4th. On this day the Russians' power of attack seemed to have exhausted itself. They had suffered enormous losses and the driving-back of the Austro-Hungarian XIV. Corps was the only success they had to show. Only on the 6th did strong forces from the Russian VIII. Army once more attempt a counter-attack on Mackensen's eastern front; but this did not succeed in preventing the establishment of the XLI. Corps on the line Starzawa - Czerniawa. On the front of the IV. Army all was quiet on June 4. The Russian plan of holding the San line, and relieving their hard-pressed VIII. Army by a powerful counter-offensive in the Rudnik area, had thus failed.
While Przemysl was being invested and captured Puhallo's and Bohm's armies were engaged with Brussilov's left wing S.E. of the fortress. The former had taken over the III. Army from Boroev16, who on May 24 was put in command of the V. Army against Italy. Early on June 2 Bohm made an energetic attack in conjunction with the German Beskiden Corps on the right wing of the III. Army, but on this day met with no success. Only by slow degrees and step by step could the divisions of the II. Army work their way forward up to the strong hostile positions. On the 3rd the Beskiden Corps succeeded in breaking through the Russian lines at Husakow and in establishing itself on the heights W. of Myslatycze, while the divisions of the XVII. Corps in touch with it to the W. gained a firm footing on the crest N.W. of Husakow. The success of the attack was greater next day. In conjunction with the XI. Army the XVII. Corps pushed forward to the heights E. of Wola Locka, and there met with strong resistance. The Beskiden Corps was engaged by the evening against the hostile positions W. of Czyski and N. of Rakosc (S.W. of Mosciska), where it connected with the left-wing corps of the II. Army, which had itself done excellent work in the area to the S. of the Beskiden Corps and in conjunction with it.
Battle of Stryj, and Fighting on the Pruth and Dniester (May 24 - June 15). - Simultaneously with the attacks of the IV., XI., III. and II. Armies, there began on May 24 on the German Southern Army front a 48 hours' intense artillery preparation, which was followed by the actual attack on the morning of the 26th. The front of Linsingen's army extended from Hruszow on the Bystrycza E. of Drohobycz, S. W. of Stryj, and E. of Bolechow to the Dolina area. The 5 inf. divs. of Shtcherbachev's XI. Russian Army were opposed by 8 inf. divs. and 3 independent brigades.
The results of the first day's operations were brilliant. FieldMarshal Szurmay's corps on the left stormed the hostile positions at Gaje, while the 38th Honved Inf. Div. and the left wing of Gen. Count Bothmer's German Corps in touch with it pressed forward successfully before Stryj. Hofmann's Austro-Hungarian corps also made progress N. of Dolina. Gen. Gerok's XXIV. German Reserve Corps fighting on the right wing to the S. W. of Dolina, on the other hand, beat off all attacks. As on the second day, however, the Russians everywhere maintained their strong positions with the utmost stubbornness, the attack was brought to a standstill, and recourse had to be made to sapping, as on the II. Army front.
During the next few days the Russians endeavoured to clear their front by a series of strong counter-attacks mostly delivered by night against Hofmann's Austro-Hungarian corps; and they succeeded by the morning of the 30th in forcing it back behind the Swica to the line Lisowice - Hoszow. Here, however, their progress was checked by Hofmann and the 24th Reserve Corps.
On the 31st Bothmer's energetic attack on Stryj turned the scale of victory in favour of the Southern Army. Advancing in conjunction with Szurmay's S. wing from the Holobutow area, he defeated the enemy, taking 9,050 prisoners, 8 guns and 15 machine-guns - and, pushing on through Stryj, established himself on the line Lisowice - E. of Stryj - S. of Brigidau.
The effect of this was immediately felt on the Southern Army front. Szurmay's left wing, on June 1, stormed the Russian line N.E. of Drohobycz, and pursuing by Kolodruby and Mikolajow, drove the enemy back on Medenice. The 1st Ca y. Div. and 5 battalions of the II. Army, which had joined in the attack, were placed under the Southern Army. On June 2 Bothmer's corps took Lisiatycze, but its Est Div., fighting E. of Stryj, made no progress. The 38th Honved Inf. Div. and Szurmay's right wing during the night drove the Russians back to the Dniester.
The Supreme Army Command now proposed, while securing its flank on the Dniester, to push Bothmer's corps and the main body of Szurmay's corps eastwards towards Zurawno against the flank of the Russian IX. Army, thus relieving the pressure on Pflanzer Baltin. The execution of this scheme produced excellent results. Yielding to Bothmer's pressure, the whole Russian line was in retreat early on the 4th. While Szurmay on the line of the bridge-heads of Mikolajow and Kolodruby undertook to guard the flank facing the Dniester, Bothmer advanced on Zurawno with the 38th Honved and German 1st and Guard Divs. By the evening Hofmann and Gerok, taking up the pursuit towards Kalisz, had reached the line Zawadka - Holyn. Here on the 5th the right-wing corps of the Russian IX. Army stood stubbornly at bay, while Bothmer was already preparing to force the Dniester at Zurawno, which he had taken by a coup de main. Meanwhile the 1st Ca y. Div. had advanced by Tejsarow on Zydaczow, and on the W. flank Szurmay repulsed powerful counter-attacks by the Russian XXII. Corps.
On the 6th Gerok and Hofmann broke the resistance of Lechitski's right wing at Holyn and Zawadka, and pursued the XI. Corps, which had been in action there, b y Kalisz on towards Wojnilow. Bothmer, with the 38th Honved Inf. Div. and the Guard Div., stormed the heights N. of the Dniester, and on the 7th, after violent fighting with parts of the Russian XVIII. Corps, forced the Russians to retire from Nowoszyny. The 38th Honved Div. reached Bukaczowce that evening. On the 8th Hofmann's troops forced the passage of the Lomnica, and pressed on towards Halicz and J ezupol, while Gerok entered Stanislau The task of the Southern Army, to roll up the hostile line in front of Pflanzer's army by an attack eastwards, was more than fulfilled when it had reached the line Halicz-Stanislau. The right wing of the Russian IX. Army had indeed been in retreat since June 9. Pflanzer-Baltin's army had been forced back behind the Pruth by the Russian counter-offensive in the middle of May, and only at Kolomea did it continue to hold a position somewhat in the nature of a bridge-head on the N. bank. Its line ran from Delatyn, which it enclosed N.E. of Pasieczna to the Perehinsko area, where it touched Linsingen's right. On May 21 the Russians had stopped their advance and entrenched themselves along their whole front; they had some 11 inf. and 8 ca y. divs. as against 8 Austro-Hungarian inf. and 5 ca y. divs., with 5 independent brigades. On June 1 they delivered an unsuccessful attack against Pflanzer's left-wing corps under Field-Marshal-Lt. Count Schonburg; and next day they turned against the neighbouring corps, the Xiii., S. of Nadworna, which also held its ground. On the 3rd, however, the Russian 2nd Rifle Div. managed to force a passage to the S. bank of the Pruth at Sadzawka, but was thrown back to the Pruth next day, after heavy fighting, by the hastily reenforced Eastern Group under Field-Marshal-Lt. von Czibulka.
In view of the change which had meantime taken place in the situation on the German Southern Army front, the Russians seemed determined to press forward in the direction of Delatyn, in order to secure a fresh success against the VII. Army and to put a stop to the Southern Army's progress. During the whole of the 5th they assailed the 5th Inf. Div. and Czibulka's group with the utmost violence, and forced the latter back to the line Mlodiatyn-Peczeniczyn. By the evening, however, the Austro-Hungarian troops, reenforced by some battalions from the neighbouring groups and by the 8th and 10th Ca y. Divs., succeeded in driving them back to the line Kniazdw'or-Mlodiatyn, and in holding this line until the 6th.
At noon on the 4th Pflanzer-Baltin, hearing that the Russian XI. Army was withdrawing on its whole front, issued orders to Count Schonburg, in command of his left-wing group, and to Gen. Baron von Rhemen, commanding the XIII. Corps, to assume the offensive, which would also relieve Czibulka's hard-pressed troops. Schonburg was to advance eastwards with his main body on Bohorodczany, and with his right wing on Solotwina, while Rhemen was directed on Nadworna and Krasna. By the evening Schonburg had succeeded in getting forward to the heights S.E. of Maniawa, and to the line Kryczka-Jablonka-Majdan-Krasna. His advance came to a standstill on the 5th, but by then the flank attack of the Southern Army had begun to make itself felt. During the 6th the Russian attacks on Rhemen's and Czibulka's front entirely ceased, and in front of Schonburg's group rearward movements suggested that the Russian front was about to be withdrawn.
On the 7th Pflanzer-Baltin assumed the offensive all along the line. The Russians were thrown back again over the Pruth at Sadzawka, and the 36th Div. pursued them on to the far bank. The XIII. Corps got well beyond Nadworna, while Schonburg continued his attack in an easterly direction, and by nightfall stood on the Bystrycza Nadwornianska at Grabowice. Marschall's corps took Zablotow, and Korda's XI. Corps and the 5th and 6th Cay. Divs. crossed the Pruth below the confluence of the Czeremosz. On the 8th Schonburg reached the Ottynia area, while Rhemen, Czibulka and Krautwald (III. Corps) reached the line ChlebiczynKorszow-Kamionka Wk.-Gwozdziec and the area E. of Wolczkowce. The right wing was advancing victoriously beyond the Pruth between Czernowitz and Sniatyn.
The 9th saw further successes; the centre and left wing forced the Russians back from the line of heights N.E. of Ottynia and Obertyn and S.W. of Horodenka. At this date Field-Marshal Lt. von Kaiser assumed command in place of Gen. von Marschall, who had been appointed to a command in the Southern Army.
Meantime, however, events on the Southern Army's front had taken an unfavourable turn, which had its repercussion on the operations of the VII. Army. Gerok's corps and the German 5th Ca y. Div. had to be detached from the right of the Southern Army to its left, which was in a perilous position. This transfer, together with the fact that Schonburg and Rhemen were pushing eastwards, could not fail to create a gap in the area of Stanislau which would involve considerable danger to the inner wings of the Southern and VII. Armies if the Russians became aware of it in time. The direction of the VII. Army's advance, therefore, had to be changed from E. to N. Schonburg and Rhemen were to move to the Mariampol-Nizniow area, Czibulka to Potok Zloty, Krautwald to Czernelica, Kaiser to the adjoining Zaleszczycki area, while Korda was to attack in the direction of Toporoutz.
The Russians had meantime resolved on a counter-offensive against the Southern Army. Bothmer's advance in the Zurawno area, the possible loss of the Mikolajow bridge-head, and an advance by the Southern Army in the direction of Lemberg, would have a serious influence on the Russian situation, both in the battle of Przemysl and on the Lower Dniester.
On the 7th the right of the XI. Russian Army reenforced by 2 divisions delivered a series of fierce attacks against Szurmay's group, which were driven back by the 8th to the line Derzow Bilcze-Medenice. At the same time a similar counter-blow was delivered against Bothmer in the Zurawno area; he held his ground successfully on the 8th, but on the morrow the superiority of the enemy on his front was so overwhelming that he withdrew to his old positions behind the Dniester. Szurmay's group also, attacked on both wings, had again to retire, and was withdrawn to the line Ruda-Tejsarow-Wolica-Letnia-Dobrowlany-Hruszow.
Faced with the urgent necessity of assisting his hard-pressed left wing, Gen. Linsingen left on his right wing before Stanislau and Halicz only Marschall's group and Hofmann's Corps. Gerok's corps (19th Inf. Div. and 38th Honved Inf. Div.) was entrusted with the defence of the Dniester between Ostrow and Zurawno, while Bothmer, with 1st Inf. Div., the 3rd Guards Div., the 48th Reserve Div., and the 40th Honved Inf. Div., counter-attacked from the Salatycze-Zurawno area in the direction of Ruda and Zydaczow. Meanwhile Szurmay's group, covered on its left by the 4th Cay. Div., had, without any assistance from other troops, forced back the enemy to Litynia, and assumed the offensive all along its front.
On the 11th the 1st Inf. Div. stormed Zurawno, and the 3rd Guard and 40th Honved Inf. Div. approached Zydaczow, while Marschall's group repulsed all attacks on Stanislau, and Hofmann's Corps prepared to carry Halicz.
The Russians, however, who had observed all their preparations, were ready with the necessary counter-measures. Reonforced by contingents from the VI. Corps, they made an attempt to break through Szurmay's front along the road to Stryj, but all their attacks failed. On the 4th, reenforced by two new divisions (33rd and 44th) of the XXI. Corps, they again attacked all along the front, and Szurmay's troops had once more to be withdrawn.
Meanwhile, the VII. Army's offensive northwards had met with great success. On the right wing Korda's corps threw the Russians back over the heights of Brdo Horosdyszcze on to the Bessarabian frontier, while Kaiser's group, despite fierce resistance, took the village of Zaleszczyki and reached the N. bank of the Dniester at Zezawa; the centre stormed the heights S. of Czernelica, while Rhemen and Schonburg on the left wing occupied Jezierzany and the area S. of Tysmienica.
On the 12th these two corps crossed the line Tysmienica-Tlumacz, and then moved against the fortifications of Nizniow, which were stormed after a short artillery preparation on the 15th. On this date the S. bank of the Dniester was in German-Austrian possession from Mariampol to Kosmierzyn, where units of the 15th Inf. Div.
(XIII. Corps) crossed to the N. bank. After a short but violent resistance the Russians were driven back, and the advance was resumed on Potok Zloty.
Korda's corps on the 12th drove the Russians over the frontier, and pursued them by way of Chotin and Wladiczna to beyond Nowosielica. During the pursuit the 6th Ca y. Div. encountered hostile resistance at Raszkow, which was quickly overcome. As any further penetration over the frontier, however, involved the danger, not only of being as an isolated advance, unsuccessful, but of opening too wide a gap in the line near Zaleszczycki, the Austro-German front was withdrawn over the frontier on the 15th.
A favourable influence on the situation on the right wing had been exercised by the break-through achieved by Mackensen's Army Group, after the battle of Przemysl, at Mosciska and Lubaczow.
After the fall of Przemysl, the armies of Mackensen, Puhallo and Bohm pursued Brussilov's army with rapidly succeeding attacks until June 5. On the heights W. and S.W. of Mosciska, as far as Wielki Bloto on the one hand and on the Middle and Lower Lubaczowka on the other, Brussilov hoped again to hold up the AustroGerman advance. After Mackensen's capture of Starzawa on the 5th the attack came to a standstill before the strong Russian positions. Here, as before Przemysl, the II. Army had recourse to sapping, which by the 12th brought it sufficiently far forward for the assault of the enemy lines.
Mackensen had now assumed command of the IV., XI. and II. Armies; the III. Army had been broken up, its X. and XVII. Corps going to the IV. Army after the fall of Przemysl, and the Beskiden Corps to the II. Army. He determined to make use of the breathingspace for a thorough preparation of the attack. Reserves had to be brought up to strengthen the armies, which in the matter of material also had to be made again fit to take the field by bringing up a sufficient store of munitions and by establishing a new base of supplies. Mackensen's Army Group was organized on June To as follows: The IV. Army (Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) stood on the front held by it during the Russian counter-offensive; the VIII. and XIV. Corps on the left wing to S. of Tarnagora the X. Corps, brought up from the III. Army, extended thence to Stare Miasto, and the IX. Corps from Stare Miasto to the Wislok. S. of that river as far as the heights at the confluence of the Lubaczowka, stood the XVII. Corps, also from the III. Army. The total strength of the Army amounted to 14 inf. and itca y. divs. From the Lower Lubaczowka to S. of Czerniawa by way of Zapalow, E. of Chotyniec and Starzawa, the XI. Army held the line. It was composed from N.W. to S.E. of the combined corps, the German X., XXII. and Guard Corps, the Austro-Hungarian VI. and the German XLI. Corps - in all 14 inf. divs. The positions of Bohm's II. Army, which adjoined it, extended from S. of Czerniawa in a circle W. of and S.W.
of Mosciska to the S. edge of the Wielki Bloto. This army comprised the Beskiden Corps, the Austro-Hungarian IV., XIX., XVIII. and V. Corps-14 divs. and i Landsturm Hussar brigade.
The Russian front was held by the III. Army from the Vistula to the upper Lubaczowka S. of Zapalow, and by the VII. Army thence to the Wielki Bloto. In all there were 41 inf. and 6 ca y. divs. and 9 Reichwehr brigades of which, however, on June 14 two divisions of the XXI. Corps had been transferred to the W. flank of their XI. Army for the counter-offensive against Szurmay.
The general attack by all three armies began on the 13th. That of the IV. Army opened at 5: 40 A.M. on the 12th with a powerful artillery preparation against the Russian positions at Sieniawa. In the course of the day Lt.-Gen. Behr's combined corps on the N. wing of the XI. Army succeeded in passing the Lubaczowka, and the Austrian 26th Landwehr Inf. Div. crossed the San at Ubieszyn and Lezachow, S. of Sieniawa, and finally got possession of the lastnamed place, which was held despite Russian counter-attacks.
At dawn on the 13th the XVII. Corps stormed the strong points of the hostile line at Sieniawa and Jukowa Gora, E. of it. These strong points were technically strengthened. Units of the IX. Corps had meanwhile passed to the E. bank of the San, including the whole of the 10th Div., which came into action in support of the XVII. Corps. On the same day Mackensen and Bohm opened the main attack. The Austro-Hungarian VI. Corps succeeded in pressing forward to Malastow, and to the N. of this the Guard advanced victoriously on Krakowiec. On the other hand, the II. Army at first made little headway until in the night of the 14th the successes of the XI. Army on the previous day began to have an effect. As early as the evening of the 13th the Russians began their retreat, which on the morning of the 14th became general. On this day the XVII. Corps of the IV. Army pushed forward on Cewkow and the IX. on Tarnogrod, the northerly advance of the latter being intended to facilitate the advance of the adjoining X. Corps over the San. The objectives of the XI. Army were, to the E., the line SaknyKrakowiec, and to the N., in conjunction with the IV. Army, the area S. of Lubaczow. The II. Army was to advance beyond Mosciska. By the evening of the 14th the Russians had fallen back behind that town to a new defensive line which they had prepared on the heights W. of Sadowa Wisznia, at Krakowiec and Oleszyce. This line, however, also fell on the 15th. On the previous day the VI. Corps had for the second time succeeded in breaking through the Russian front at Krakowiec, and on the following day the German XXII. Corps did the same in the Niemirow direction, and the German X. Corps in that of Oleszyce and Lubaczow. On the IV. Army front the IX. Corps captured the point d'appui of Pioskorowice, while the XVII. Corps exploited its success at Sieniawa. The Russian resistance also gave way in front of BOhm's army, which on the 15th had stormed the Russian stronghold W. of Sadowa Wisznia.
On the evening of the 15th and on the 16th, the Russians were in retreat along the whole front. They had once more been beaten decisively in the battles of Przemysl, Mosciska, and the Lubaczowka, and were now in full flight towards Lemberg. There existed now between the victorious Austro-Germans and the capital of Galicia only a single line of defence on the Grodek and Janow marshes of the Wereszyca, on which the 1914 battles of Lemberg and Rawa Ruska had been fought, and on this line the Russians once more attempted to make a stand.
Their losses since the commencement of the spring campaign in Galicia had already amounted to no less than 971 officers and 391,000 men captured, with 304 guns, 763 machine-guns, and vast quantities of other material. (E. J.)
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